The Persistent Struggles of Cultural Reform in Defence

ED: From my inbox … author’s name withheld on request.

Efforts to implement meaningful cultural change within the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the Department of Defence have long been fraught with challenges. Despite multiple strategies and inquiries, progress remains inconsistent, and systemic issues continue to hinder reform.

A History of Initiatives

In 2012, the Pathway to Change 2012–2017 strategy was introduced in response to significant cultural failings within Defence, including issues with the treatment of women, alcohol misuse, and inappropriate use of social media. Acknowledging harmful elements within its culture that limited performance and damaged reputation, the strategy outlined 175 recommendations from independent reviews, all of which Defence claimed to have “addressed.”

The subsequent Pathway to Change – Evolving Defence Culture 2017–2022 sought to build on earlier reforms, with Defence asserting the continued relevance of cultural change to sustain public trust and meet government objectives. However, a damning 2021 report from the Australian National Audit Office revealed glaring shortcomings. It found that Defence lacked effective monitoring and reporting mechanisms, preventing assurance that intended outcomes were being achieved.

Leadership and Accountability

Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles has joined a series of defence ministers critical of Defence leadership. Earlier this year, he described cultural issues within leadership as a barrier to achieving “a culture of absolute excellence.” Marles also highlighted the detrimental effects of frequent ministerial turnover during the previous government, describing it as a “revolving door” that destabilized morale and hindered progress.

According to Associate Professor James Connor of UNSW Canberra, the rapid turnover of defence ministers exacerbates the problem. Ministers often depend heavily on the department and the ADF for expertise, making sustained reform difficult. Connor argues that Defence frequently employs delaying tactics, including accepting recommendations “in principle” and waiting for new inquiries to overshadow earlier ones.

Ongoing Failures and Lessons Unlearned

The recent Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide underscored Defence’s longstanding resistance to reform. Its final report pointed to the failure of successive governments, the ADF, and associated agencies to implement necessary changes or adequately address the needs of those who serve. Despite over 750 recommendations from prior inquiries, the commission found that meaningful reform remains elusive.

Connor, who testified at the commission, noted that many of its recommendations echo those from a 2004 Senate inquiry into military justice, which called for external oversight of military conduct. “Twenty years later, the same problems persist,” he said. He emphasized the need for accountability, questioning the absence of consequences for senior officers failing to enact required reforms.

The Way Forward

The commission’s findings further highlight systemic issues within Defence leadership, including abuse of power and the perpetuation of toxic subcultures. Frequent rotations of senior officers enable leaders to avoid responsibility, while entrenched behaviours hinder genuine reform.

Connor advocates for increased civilian oversight to ensure sustained accountability and to break the cycle of inaction. Without robust mechanisms to hold leaders accountable, meaningful cultural change in Defence remains a distant goal.

As Defence grapples with the weight of repeated failures, the question remains: how long will it take for the institution to learn from its past and implement the reforms necessary to protect its people and its reputation?

 

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One comment

  • John (Jack) Snell November 26, 2024   Reply →

    Just what we need, another sociologist telling us what is needed. NOT. What was the angriest man he has ever seen and has he ever been cold, hungry and frightened: all at once and in the dark? Has he ever served?

    The ADF has suffered sufficient civilian oversight in various ways since the Whitlam-inspired Tange review of Defence in the early 70s and where has that got us? Are these civilians really going to improve our military leadership to a point comparable to that many of us oldies served under?

    I’m sorry if I seem old and cynical, but that’s the way I see our modern ADF. I feel so sorry for those subordinates that now serve in it.

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