Review and the 1987 Defence of Australia white paper. Despite various updates and tweaks over the years, the core assumptions and frameworks continue to dominate Australia’s defence posture. It’s now urgent that we break from this status quo.

Liz Buchanan, Senior Fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), recently echoed this sentiment in a piece titled Australia’s defence is lost in a fog of strategic failure and a lack of imagination. Buchanan’s analysis highlights the shortcomings of our current defence strategy, particularly its Australia’s strategic and defence policies have remained largely unchanged since the 1986 Dibb inability to evolve in response to contemporary threats. In her words, “Our government has boxed itself into a corner. We must spend more on defence, but the suppression of informed public debate and cost-of-living realities make this an unlikely option for Prime Minister Anthony Albanese.”

Much of Australia’s current strategic thinking is still shaped by the assumptions of the 1980s. The Dibb Review argued that Australia would have a 10-year warning period in the event of a serious attack, allowing the nation time to mobilize and prepare. This was reinforced by the belief that our access to advanced intelligence systems would provide ample time to detect and respond to threats. However, this long-standing assumption is increasingly outdated. The modern strategic environment is far more dynamic, with threats emerging faster and from more diverse sources.

Deterrence was another key concept from the Dibb Review, advocating that Australia’s defence planning should focus on preventing aggression by demonstrating the capability to respond with force. Yet, Buchanan points out that this model no longer works in today’s multipolar world. Australia’s reliance on deterrence through denial – the idea that showing strength will discourage attacks – is insufficient given the rising threats in our region.

In recent years, Australia has relied heavily on its alliance with the United States. While partnerships are essential, Buchanan warns that this dependence limits Australia’s ability to craft an independent defence policy suited to the evolving Indo-Pacific landscape. She argues that Australia’s defence and foreign policy is still “entrenched in short-term domestic political considerations, devoid of strategic imagination.” This narrow approach leaves Australia vulnerable, particularly as emerging global powers challenge the status quo.

Buchanan also highlights a growing disconnect between Australia’s perception of its role in the international system and the realities of its strategic environment. Australia, she argues, has a “middle-power ego on a small-power budget.” While we aspire to influence global and regional affairs, our defence investments do not match the scale of our ambitions. This creates a dangerous gap between what we want to achieve and what we are capable of defending.

The solution? Buchanan calls for a strategic overhaul, driven by strong leadership and a national conversation about defence. “Government needs to come to the party and rapidly enhance its appetite for risk,” she asserts. Only by acknowledging the harsh realities of the Indo-Pacific can Australia build a defence strategy that is both sustainable and responsive to future challenges.

In short, Australia can no longer afford to rest on the policies of the past. The world has changed, and so must we.

Regardless of one’s stance—whether they are pro-Israel or pro-Hamas—there is no disputing the tragic reality: civilians in Gaza are being killed. This fact remains irrefutable, yet the contentious issue lies in understanding Israel’s actions. Are they deliberately targeting civilians, or are these casualties an unintended consequence of Hamas embedding itself within civilian populations?

Hamas has long been accused of using civilian areas as cover, hiding militants and weapons in schools, hospitals, and residential buildings. This tactic, while effective in shielding their assets, also tragically puts innocent people at risk. It makes it difficult for Israeli forces to neutralize threats without causing harm to civilians. Israel maintains that its strikes aim to neutralize military targets but are often hindered by Hamas’ strategy of blending in with civilians. This raises ethical and moral dilemmas—how can any nation defend itself while trying to minimize civilian casualties when its adversary uses civilians as human shields?

On the other side of the narrative, a controversial phenomenon has emerged known as “Gazawood” or “Pallywood.” These terms refer to staged or exaggerated scenes of destruction and suffering, often circulated in pro-Palestinian media. The intent is to garner sympathy for the Palestinian cause by presenting Israel as indiscriminately bombing civilians. In some cases, actors, including children, are portrayed as victims in these videos. Such manipulations blur the lines between genuine tragedies and fabrications, feeding into polarized narratives on social media.

When watching these clips, it’s important to critically assess their authenticity. Why are some supposedly dire situations being filmed with high-end equipment and sound effects that seem out of place in a war zone? This doesn’t negate the fact that real suffering occurs in Gaza, but it does call for discernment in differentiating between propaganda and reality.

In sum, while there is no denying the devastation in Gaza and the loss of civilian life, there are complexities to consider. Hamas’ use of civilians as shields and the dissemination of misleading footage complicate the public’s understanding of the conflict. It’s crucial to recognize these layers while remaining empathetic to the immense human toll that conflicts like this inevitably bring.

Sky News Political Contributor Chris Uhlmann slams the AEMO which announced it was unable to promise lower electricity prices despite Energy Minister Chris Bowen’s “explicit guarantee” the government could. Australian Energy Market Operator head Daniel Westerman has said he cannot guarantee the current government policies will deliver lower power prices.

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The 2nd Commando Regiment, part of the Australian Army’s Special Operations Command, conducts strategic strike, domestic counter-terrorism, and overseas special recovery operations. Originally formed to complement the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR), it is a self-contained, flexible force. The regiment provides the Tactical Assault Group (East) for high-risk incidents on the eastern coast of Australia.

Pat Conroy, Australian minister for defence industry and capability delivery, and Maj. Gen. Richard Vagg, the Army’s head of land capability at the 2024 Land Forces conference in Melbourne. (ADF Cpl. Janet Pan)

WASHINGTON: Australia is set to announce a contract for the domestic production of 155mm artillery shells within the next few weeks, according to Defence Acquisition Minister Pat Conroy. While the country currently imports these shells from a South African Rheinmetall subsidiary, this move aims to boost local manufacturing capabilities in response to growing international demand, largely driven by the war in Ukraine.

Conroy confirmed that the NIOA-Rheinmetall partnership, along with French firm Thales, is competing for the contract, with a third, undisclosed bidder also in the mix. Few details regarding the contract value or production quantities have been revealed.

The shift toward domestic production aligns with Australia’s broader defence strategy. Major General Richard Vagg emphasized the need for local 155mm production, reflecting the government’s substantial investments in the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Enterprise (GWEO), which has allocated up to AUD 21 billion over the next decade.

Conroy also expressed optimism about Australia’s role in the global munitions supply chain, aiming to expand production capacity beyond domestic needs. Alongside 155mm shell production, Canberra is exploring solid rocket motor manufacturing, a critical element for missile production.

During his recent visit to Washington, Conroy discussed a $7 billion AUD deal for SM-2 and SM-6 missiles for the Australian Navy with U.S. Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro, focusing on securing production slots and delivery timelines.

Washington Post

The US Continues to Push for an Elusive “Ceasefire,” But It Seems Yahya Sinwar, the Late Hamas Leader, Was Never Interested in Peace

As global leaders call for peace in the Middle East, one thing has become increasingly clear: the late Hamas leader, Yahya Sinwar, had no intention of negotiating for a ceasefire. Despite international pressure, Sinwar’s strategy was not to de-escalate but to escalate, banking on a deadly cycle to push his agenda forward.

Sinwar’s Strategy: Casualties as Leverage

Sinwar’s approach to the conflict was ruthless. As Israeli forces closed in on him, he made it clear to Hamas that no concessions should be made under any circumstances. His belief? That the higher the civilian death toll, the stronger Hamas would stand in negotiations with Israel and the international community. It’s a chilling reminder that, for Sinwar, peace was never the goal.

His twisted strategy was built on the suffering of civilians, with the expectation that each life lost would harden Hamas’ position and weaken Israel’s resolve. Sinwar ordered his followers to refuse any Israeli peace offerings, no matter the potential for relief for Gaza’s citizens. In his mind, high casualties equalled leverage—a cruel calculation that prolonged suffering on all sides.

Leadership Beyond Death: Sinwar’s Final Orders

Even after his death, Sinwar’s tactics continue to guide Hamas’ actions. Reports suggest that before his death, Sinwar instructed Hamas leadership to reject any possibility of compromise and to form a leadership council to perpetuate his hardline strategies. In the wake of his death, Hamas has shown no signs of altering its approach. Civilian casualties remain tragically high, and Hamas’ leadership has remained firm in rejecting concessions, as per Sinwar’s orders.

While many had hoped that Sinwar’s death might shift the dynamics within Hamas, the group’s brutal methods persist. The question now is: how long can this cycle of violence continue? And with Hamas unwavering in its deadly strategy, will there ever be room for a lasting ceasefire?

A Grim Forecast for Peace

As the US and other nations continue to push for a ceasefire, the reality is that Sinwar’s legacy casts a long shadow over any peace negotiations. His belief in the power of civilian suffering as a bargaining tool reflects a deep unwillingness to seek peace—a mentality that remains entrenched in Hamas leadership.

Without a significant shift in strategy or leadership, it’s difficult to see how the situation can improve. For now, the prospect of a true ceasefire remains elusive. As long as Hamas follows Sinwar’s brutal playbook, the bloodshed seems destined to continue, leaving the region trapped in a tragic cycle with no end in sight.

Australia, the United States, and Britain have axed barriers to sharing defence technologies, a significant boost for the AUKUS alliance. Now, 70 percent of defence exports from the U.S. to Australia, previously under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), will be licence-free.

The launch of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 confronted the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with a new geopolitical reality. Once described as “braindead” by French President Emmanuel Macron, the alliance was jolted into action by a threat that seemed consigned to history—a full-scale conventional war in Europe.

Military leaders began issuing warnings of a resurgent Russia, stressing the need for NATO allies to be prepared within three, five, or eight years. Romanian Defence Chief Gheorghita Vlad underscored the gravity of the situation, stating in February 2024, “The Russian Federation has become a problem for the world order, for democracy. It is not just a war with Ukraine but a war against the democratic world.”

Following decades of post-Cold War downsizing and years of focusing on counterinsurgency rather than traditional military threats, NATO’s readiness for this new challenge has come into question. European defence budgets shrank during the “peace dividend” years, and the shadow of former U.S. President Donald Trump’s potential return to the White House adds uncertainty to NATO’s cohesion.

According to Gordon B. Davis, a senior fellow at the Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and NATO’s former deputy assistant secretary general, NATO’s current capabilities are not sufficient to defeat Russia without significant costs. However, NATO’s collective strength still makes it a formidable force.

As of 2024, NATO’s 32 members, especially its European contingent, face challenges such as ammunition shortages, fragmented defence industries, and limited air defence coverage. Yet, in many aspects, even the European portion of NATO can outgun Russian forces. NATO, excluding the U.S., has approximately 1.9 million active personnel, 2,400 combat-ready aircraft, and 6,650 tanks, compared to Russia’s 1.1 million troops, 1,370 aircraft, and 2,000 tanks, according to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

The accession of Sweden and Finland further strengthened NATO, adding well-trained militaries and extending the alliance’s defence line with Russia by over 1,300 kilometres. This expansion puts additional pressure on Russia’s defence capabilities.

NATO also possesses superior long-range firepower, with advanced jets like the F-35, and more modern airpower compared to Russia. Ed Arnold, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), remarked that Russia’s tactics in Ukraine would likely be ineffective against NATO forces, which could swiftly decimate Russian troops in a short, intense conflict.

However, a quick war may not be what NATO would face. The Russian state and society, as demonstrated during the first year of the invasion, appear capable of enduring initial losses and regrouping for a prolonged conflict. NATO planners view the Baltic states as particularly vulnerable to attack, given their proximity to Russia and Belarus, and the strategic Suwalki Gap remains a crucial concern.

While NATO’s firepower could overwhelm Russian forces, Davis cautioned that NATO might still suffer significant losses, particularly from Russian bombers, drones, and submarines targeting NATO territory. The balance of power between the two forces remains uncertain, hinging on political will, resources, and the endurance of Western societies in a potential long war.