The Strategic Role of Submarines in Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups

An aircraft carrier does not necessarily need a submarine nearby, as both are powerful naval assets with distinct roles and capabilities. However, they are often deployed together to enhance operational effectiveness and security. Here’s why submarines might accompany aircraft carrier groups:

A submarine can provide an extra layer of protection for the carrier battle group. Submarines excel at detecting and potentially engaging enemy submarines that could threaten the carrier. This defensive role is crucial for safeguarding the carrier and its accompanying vessels.

Submarines are instrumental in anti-submarine warfare, actively hunting down enemy submarines to protect the carrier group from underwater threats. Their stealth and advanced detection capabilities make them ideal for this role.

Submarines can operate undetected for extended periods, making them valuable assets for intelligence gathering. They can monitor enemy activities, including the locations of ships and submarines, providing crucial information to the carrier group for strategic planning and decision-making.

In certain scenarios, a submarine and carrier group might coordinate their efforts for combined operations. The submarine could launch a surprise attack on an enemy target, while the carrier’s aircraft provide air support, creating a powerful and versatile strike capability.

While submarines offer significant advantages, several factors influence their deployment alongside carrier groups:

  • Resource Intensity: Submarines are expensive to operate and require substantial resources, making their deployment a strategic decision based on mission priorities.
  • Existing Defences: Carrier groups are equipped with their own anti-submarine defences, including helicopters, sonar buoys, and specialized equipment, providing robust protection even without a submarine.

While a submarine is not a necessity for an aircraft carrier group, its presence can enhance protection, intelligence, and operational versatility. The decision to deploy a submarine alongside a carrier group is based on strategic considerations and specific mission objectives, balancing the benefits of additional security and capabilities against the costs and resources involved.

National Commemorative Service to Mark 25 Years Since Australian Service in Timor-Leste

On Friday, 20 September 2024, we will commemorate the 25th anniversary of Australian service in Timor-Leste. This significant milestone honours the contributions and sacrifices made by Australian personnel in the region over a span of 14 years, from 1999 to 2013.

Australian involvement in Timor-Leste included dedicated service from members of the Australian Defence Force, the Australian Federal Police, as well as numerous civilians who played crucial roles in the mission. Their collective efforts were pivotal in supporting peace and stability in Timor-Leste during a critical period in its history.

A national commemorative service will be held at the Australian Peacekeeping Memorial on Anzac Parade in Canberra. This solemn event will provide an opportunity to honour and remember the six Australians who lost their lives in the line of duty, as well as to acknowledge all those who served and their families for their unwavering commitment and sacrifice.

The Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) strongly encourages everyone planning to attend the service to register their intention to do so. While a ticket will not be required for entry, registering will help ensure that adequate arrangements are made to accommodate all attendees and to facilitate a smooth and respectful commemoration.

To register your attendance, please visit the DVA website. Your participation in this important event will contribute to the collective remembrance and recognition of Australia’s service in Timor-Leste.

GCAP Unveils New Fighter Jet Concept

The UK, Italy, and Japan, partners in the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), revealed a new model of their next-generation combat aircraft at the Farnborough International Airshow. This marks their first joint exhibition at the event.

Leading industry partners—BAE Systems (UK), Leonardo (Italy), and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (Japan)—showcased advancements in the aircraft’s design. Herman Claesen of BAE Systems highlighted the collaborative progress with Italy and Japan over the past 18 months.

The new model features an improved design, including a larger wingspan for better aerodynamics. Guglielmo Maviglia of Leonardo emphasized the strong commitment and complementary qualities each partner brings to the programme.

Engineers from BAE, Leonardo, and Mitsubishi are using innovative digital tools for development, including virtual reality and computer-based modeling. Hitoshi Shiraishi of Mitsubishi noted the value of this international collaboration in fostering innovation and knowledge exchange.

Set to be operational by 2035, the aircraft will feature advanced technology such as an intelligent weapons system, a software-driven cockpit, integrated sensors, and a powerful radar. GCAP aims to enhance military capabilities, security, and economic prosperity for the UK, Italy, and Japan, employing tens of thousands and advancing industrial skills and technologies.

18 August Service at Canungra QLD

Please find attached the open invitation to attend a service and plaque unveiling at the Vietnam War Memorial at Canungra on Sunday 18 August 2024.

Our combined RAA plaque will be unveiled along with several other Corps and Unit plaques. Kevin O’Brien will deliver the main address during the service which commences at 1100 hours.

Please let me know if any Gunners and family members are attending and I will collate and pass numbers to the organisers. Alternatively, you may contact the organisers directly. Any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Peter Bruce, OAM, JP
President
4th Field Regiment (SVN) Old Boys
[email protected]
0419 349 317

CLICK LINK to read details

Invitation to attend Canungra Vietnam Veterans Memorial Service

My view of ORIGIN, don’t ever be in credit

I spent the entire morning trying to get a refund from Origin, only to end up frustrated and without a satisfactory resolution. My ordeal began with being shuffled from one department to another, each time told they couldn’t assist and passed along, with long waiting times in between. Finally, someone was willing to attempt to help.

This issue started on July 9th when our account was over $500 in credit, anticipating a potentially high bill while we were away. The bill turned out to be lower, leaving us with a credit. Origin had already messed us around with the installation of a smart meter after fitting solar panels, rescheduling the installation date and then raising our rates while reducing solar credits. Frustrated, I switched to another supplier offering better rates and solar credits.

On July 15th, I called to request a refund and was asked to provide various identification documents, which I did promptly. Shortly after, I received another email asking for a bank statement showing the last Bpay payment, which I also provided. I then received a confirmation email stating that my refund would be processed within five working days.

Today, I checked and saw no refund, leading to my wasted morning. I was told the refund wasn’t processed because my bank statement was two pages, and they required it all on one page, despite the header being on the first page and the Bpay payment on the third. Because it wasn’t on one page, they refused to credit the refund directly to my account. Instead, they said they would send a cheque to my home address, which could take up to 28 days. I had no choice but to accept this settlement.

I pointed out that if I took 28 days to pay their bill, I’d be sitting in the dark.

Throughout this process, Origin’s inefficiency and lack of proper communication were evident. Initially, they failed to handle the installation of the smart meter efficiently, causing unnecessary delays. When it came to processing my refund, they repeatedly requested additional documentation, despite already having everything needed. Each department seemed to have no coordination or understanding of the previous interactions, making me repeat my issue over and over again. The final straw was their insistence on an unreasonable documentation format, ignoring the practical constraints of standard bank statements.

In summary, Origin’s handling of my refund has been a prime example of poor customer service, lack of internal communication, and bureaucratic inefficiency. Their processes are cumbersome and customer-unfriendly, causing undue stress and inconvenience.

ED: Thank you for allowing me to vent my frustration!

Exercise Pitch Black 24 | Mindil Beach Flying Display Livestream

Streamed live on Jul 18, 2024 – 90 Minutes

The Royal Australian Air Force and international partners will return to Mindil Beach for the Exercise Pitch Black Flying Display between 5pm-6:30pm (ACST) on Thursday, 18 July 2024. Set against the stunning backdrop of the Northern Territory sunset, this free, non-ticketed event will coincide with the regular Mindil Beach Markets.

Stop 1st Commando Regiment losing their Green Berets.

For over 80 years, the knowledge and skills of Australia’s World War II Commandos and Special Operations operators have been preserved and enhanced by the part-time Commandos of the 1st Commando Regiment. This regiment is supported by a small cadre of regular Army personnel, typically from the Special Air Service Regiment and more recently from the 2nd Commando Regiment. It remains the only Army Reserve unit to have deployed on warlike operations since World War II.

Since the first Green Beret was awarded in July 1956, it is estimated that nearly 10,000 male soldiers, along with a small number of women, have qualified for this coveted beret, meeting the rigorous skills and physical requirements initially based on the Royal Marine Commando and British Army Commando standards.

Recently, Special Operations Command has proposed changes to assign the 1st Commando Regiment a new role in Special Warfare, also known as Unconventional Warfare or Guerrilla Warfare. This was the original purpose for raising the initial two part-time Commando Companies in 1955, though it was not widely known for security reasons at that time.

As a result of these new initiatives, it is intended that new part-time and full-time members of the 1st Commando Regiment will no longer be called Commandos and will no longer be eligible to be awarded the Green Beret.

CLICK LINK to sign the petition

Petition · Stop 1st Commando Regiment losing their Green Berets. – Australia · Change.org

Scrutinizing the GenCost Report: A Science and Engineering Perspective on Australia’s Energy Policy

I am glad the minister made that last comment, because as somebody with a background in science and a qualification in science, and as a former experimental test pilot in the military—in fact, having commanded Australia’s flight test centre and worked in a systems engineering environment where we were very much based on facts, data and engineering, but with a good dose of modelling in there as well—I’m actually very familiar with the sort of approach that the CSIRO has taken.

As the minister indicated, we do have things like Senate estimates, and I did take the opportunity to go to Senate estimates to speak to the CSIRO about the GenCost report.

It may come as a surprise to the minister that, when I asked the head of the CSIRO to speak about the GenCost report, having made it clear to the committee that I intended to appear at those estimates hearings to ask about the GenCost report—therefore, the expectation is that the agencies that are being quizzed will bring the appropriate officials in order to be able to answer detailed questions at estimates—I was told that the appropriate officials were not there, and the only responses that I got to some reasonably detailed questions were very generic.

So, contrary to what the minister has indicated, estimates actually proved completely useless in terms of interrogating the CSIRO over the GenCost report. I can’t speak to the motivation of CSIRO in not bringing those officials, but what it meant was that members of the Senate, on behalf of the taxpayers of Australia, were not able to scrutinise them in any detail.

If we took the minister’s contention that he just outlined then and applied it more broadly, there would be no point in having committees of the parliament at all. In matters to do with health, for example, we might ask the AMA to draft our policy and scrutinise it. In matters to do with defence, we would rely on the defence department and perhaps defence industry, and there would be no point in having any scrutiny on behalf of the Australian taxpayer.

Yet the minister knows full well, because he has been a member of committees in this place, that the whole function of committees and the Senate committee process—getting a range of witnesses who are stakeholders affected by policy or who are subject matter experts who understand the technical details, whether in health, in economics or in defence; you name it—is so that we can unpack and understand what is behind a policy or a piece of evidence.

The last point I’ll make on this, since the minister has so kindly given me this introductory runway to approach this issue, relates to the 2019 House of Representatives inquiry into the possibility of a nuclear power industry. This is going back to the 2018 GenCost report. I will look at the Hansard records from that, from Wednesday 16 October 2019.

I respect the CSIRO, as somebody who has a science degree; I respect the whole discipline of science, which is observation, measurement and proof. But when the CSIRO were quizzed in this parliamentary inquiry about the GenCost report—and I’ll paraphrase here, but those of you who would like to read it can pull up the Hansard from Wednesday 16 October 2019 for the House of Representatives Standing Committee on the Environment and Energy—essentially the narrative went like this: CSIRO said, ‘We don’t have any expertise in electricity generation by nuclear energy,’ so the committee asked, ‘Well, where did you get the figures that you used in your report, then?’ They said, ‘Well, we contracted an external consultant to provide those figures for us.’ If you look through the Hansard you’ll see the committee met on a sequence of days.

Why did they do that? Because, as each piece of evidence unfolded, they dug a bit deeper.

They had that consultant come in and they said, ‘Describe for us where you got the information from.’ What the consultant said was, ‘Well, we don’t have any expertise in nuclear power generation, so we went to the website of the World Nuclear Association to find information.’ The following day there was another hearing, this time with a representative from the World Nuclear Association, and the committee asked them, ‘Did you have this figure on your website?’ They said, ‘No, we didn’t have it on our website, and, more to the point, we think it is grossly inflated and unrepresentative of what the true costs would be.’

To the CSIRO’s great credit, they took all that on board, and I think they have been far more robust in how they’ve approached it since. But, to directly address the minister’s point, the benefit of a committee process with a range of witnesses that were able to challenge the assumptions that have been made was that it highlighted that the 2018 GenCost report was not based on any robust analysis of the facts of the cost of electricity generation, let alone any analysis of the likely price to the consumer.

I will leave that there, but I’m hoping that that completely debunks the minister’s assertion that there is no value in a parliamentary inquiry.

Estimates has not worked—and he proposed it would—and a parliamentary committee did highlight that, in this particular domain, the CSIRO did not have expertise in the paths they went down and that they delivered figures that were proved, on the public record, to not be robust.

Why do I support this?

Partly it’s because I believe in that committee process, but it’s also partly that, as someone who has worked in an engineering environment using modelling and as someone who has a qualification in science, I recognise that the GenCost report is largely a modelling activity, as opposed to science. If you search the PDF of the latest GenCost report, the word ‘assumption’ appears some 54 times, and, like in most modelling, they’ve had to make assumptions.

There are a range of assumptions in GenCost that the CSIRO themselves identify as not necessarily representative of the complete suite of factors to be considered.

I have some empathy for them; it’s a complex problem, but there are a few things that the Australian public need to be aware of. When Mr Bowen and others cite this as the be-all and end-all—the gospel according to the CSIRO that shall not be challenged—it needs to be said that it is a modelling exercise with assumptions based on an incomplete set of data.

There are other expert bodies in Australia and around the world who have also done modelling and come up with quite different answers to the same questions.

That’s why we should give the Australian people the opportunity to have different experts in the field address their modelling, their assumptions and, more importantly, their lived experience so that the Australian people can decide whether this is something that we should be moving towards.

The first point is that this modelling is not designed to understand the most effective way to get cheap and reliable electricity to the Australian consumer, whether that be mum and dad at home, a small business or an industrial sector that will probably go offshore if the power prices continue to increase.

In paragraph 1.1.1 of the latest GenCost report, which describes the roles the CSIRO and AEMO had in the report, it says ‘to provide an update of current electricity generation and storage cost’.

It’s not about highlighting the cheapest way to get electricity.

That paragraph also talks about the levelised cost of electricity, which is all about the factors affecting the cost to generation, as opposed to the full system’s costs.

The third point I would make is that they highlight, in paragraph 1.2 on page 16 of the GenCost report:

As discussed in Graham (2018) it is not possible to undertake spreadsheet type modelling to create a transparent but accurate estimate of the cost of integrating renewables.

This is one of the significant factors that affect the analysis of whether a renewables based approach can be comparable in terms of delivering reliability and low cost to the consumer versus baseload type approaches, whether that be high-flow rivers providing hydro or things like nuclear power. So they’re saying here that they can’t provide a transparent and accurate estimate costs of integrating renewables.

The report states:

If it were, this would have been the preferred method of implementation in GenCost.

Again, they quote Graham:

Graham (2018) concluded an electricity system modelling approach must be applied, where the details of the calculations are written in code that call on proprietary optimisation algorithms which unfortunately results in a loss of transparency.

I’m not saying that the CSIRO is in any way being malign in how they’re approaching this, but their chosen vendor, their chosen model, their chosen algorithms and their chosen assumptions are but one set that feeds into a model that gives an outcome of cost degeneration.

Other equally expert bodies—and I’m talking here about bodies like the International Energy Agency, the OECD, or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and their subsidiary, the NEA, the Nuclear Energy Agency—have worked together over a number of years to model not the cost to generate but the cost to the consumer.

In terms of that simple measure, the levelised cost of electricity, which even GenCost recognises is not a suitable cost for this analysis and comparison, the OECD report that came out in April 2022 looks at a systems-wide approach and demonstrates very clearly that what they call ‘long-run nuclear power’, even on a levelised cost of electricity basis, is the cheapest form of electricity.

If you run a plant for a long time, it becomes, over the life of that asset, the cheapest way to generate power. They also highlight in that analysis that even new-build nuclear is on a par with grid-scale renewables but is cheaper than others. For example, it’s actually cheaper than rooftop or offshore wind et cetera.

If people who are interested look at pages 35 to 37 of that OECD report, they then break down the elements into the generating costs, the systems costs and the broader environmental costs. They highlight that, as we seek to move to curb emissions, we will probably get to 2030 with rising, but not unaffordable, power prices. But, if we seek to get to net zero by 2050 just using variable renewables with firming by things like batteries, as more coal and gas comes out of the system in order to achieve net zero, prices will go up exponentially, and their conclusion is that it is unaffordable.

This is not the coalition saying that.

This is the OECD and the International Energy Agency.

That is why people like the IPCC are saying we need to have nuclear power as part of the mix, and that’s why so many nations around the world are looking to double or triple the amount of nuclear power generation they have.

So another point I’d make is that, despite the government’s claim that nuclear is the most expensive form of energy, the lived experience of people in countries like Canada says otherwise. If you look at some of the information coming out of Canada, you can see that nuclear is even cheaper than hydro and is certainly cheaper than gas, wind, solar and bioenergy, in terms of how the Energy Board in Ontario manages things.

That’s partly because of the broader costs that variable renewables have in terms of the additional infrastructure.

My last point will be around the Net Zero Australia project done by three universities and a consultancy, which highlighted that the cost of all the additional transmission and firming as well as new generation is going to cost us in the order of $1.2 to $1.5 trillion by 2030, and $7 to $9 trillion by 2060.

The nuclear option is actually far cheaper than the variable path the Albanese government has us on.

The Australian Army’s New Boxer CRV

Discover Australia’s cutting-edge military advancement with the Boxer Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (CRV)! In this video, we delve into the pivotal role of the Boxer CRV in modernizing Australia’s Armoured Fighting Vehicle capability under LAND 400 Phase 2. Designed to enhance the safety, security, and protection of Australian troops, the Boxer CRV replaces the long-serving Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV), providing heightened levels of protection, firepower, and mobility. Versatile Deployment: From littoral environments to complex urban settings, the Boxer CRV ensures operational versatility, supporting missions ranging from peacekeeping to close combat. Strategic Contract: Rheinmetall Defence Australia has been tasked with delivering and supporting 211 Boxer 8×8 CRVs for the Australian Army, split into Block I and Block II phases. Current Status: Block I has already delivered 25 CRVs, including reconnaissance and multi-purpose variants, demonstrating exceptional performance and availability in Army operations. Future Build: Block II, comprising 186 CRVs, is currently undergoing design and testing phases, with production centred at Rheinmetall Defence Australia’s Military Vehicle Centre of Excellence in Redbank, Queensland. The majority of Block II CRVs will be assembled at Rheinmetall Defence Australia’s state-of-the-art facility, boosting local defence manufacturing capabilities. Stay tuned as we explore how the Boxer CRV reinforces Australia’s defence posture and supports future military operations. Don’t forget to like, comment, and subscribe for more updates on Australia’s defence advancements!