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The Lockheed AC-130 gunship stands as a formidable marvel of aerial warfare, born from the venerable C-130 Hercules transport aircraft lineage and transformed into a lethal ground-attack platform. Its evolution into a fearsome weapon of war has been marked by a series of enhancements and modifications that have endowed it with unparalleled capabilities on the battlefield.

At its core, the AC-130 is distinguished by its formidable armament, which comprises a diverse array of anti-ground weapons meticulously integrated into its airframe. These weapons range from heavy-calibre cannons, such as the GAU-12/U Equalizer or the M102 howitzer, to precision-guided munitions like the AGM-176 Griffin missile and the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb. Such a comprehensive armament suite enables the AC-130 to engage a multitude of targets with precision and devastating effect.

Complementing its lethal firepower are sophisticated sensors, navigation systems, and fire-control mechanisms, which empower the AC-130 with unparalleled situational awareness and precision targeting capabilities. These advanced systems, coupled with cutting-edge technology, enable the gunship to operate effectively in diverse environments and under challenging conditions, ensuring precision strikes against enemy targets.

Unlike conventional fixed-wing aircraft, which often rely on advanced targeting systems for precision strikes, the AC-130 primarily employs visual targeting techniques. This reliance on visual acquisition necessitates operating at low altitudes, typically around 7,000 feet, to ensure clear visibility of ground targets. Despite the inherent risks associated with its large profile and low operating altitudes, the AC-130’s crew demonstrates unparalleled skill and bravery, executing close air support missions with remarkable precision and effectiveness.

Furthermore, the gunship’s preference for nighttime operations further underscores its tactical versatility and survivability. Under the cover of darkness, the AC-130 capitalizes on the element of surprise, exploiting the reduced visibility to evade enemy detection and deliver devastating blows to hostile forces with impunity.

In essence, the Lockheed AC-130 gunship stands as a testament to ingenuity and innovation in military aviation, embodying the pinnacle of aerial firepower and close air support capabilities. Its unrivalled combination of firepower, precision, and endurance renders it an indispensable asset on the modern battlefield, capable of decisively shaping the course of conflict in favour of friendly forces.

Appendix from Peter Edwards, A nation at war : Australian politics, society and diplomacy during the Vietnam War 1965–1975: the official history of Australia’s involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts 1948-1975, volume VI, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW, 1997

The National Service scheme was introduced by the Menzies Government in November 1964 and operated until December 1972, when the newly elected Whitlam Labor Government suspended it. The scheme was based on a birthday ballot of twenty-year-old men who had registered their names with the Department of Labour and National Service (DLNS). If balloted in, these men were called up to perform two years’ continuous full-time service in the Regular Army Supplement, followed by three years’ part-time service in the Regular Army Reserve. National servicemen on full-time duty were liable for what was called ‘special overseas service’, which included combat duties in Vietnam. When the scheme was introduced the Government planned to raise 4200 servicemen during the second half of 1965, then 6900 annually thereafter. This would create the desired Army strength of 37 500 full-time soldiers. In August 1965 Menzies announced that from 1966 the annual intake would be maintained at 8400 (two intakes of 4200), resulting in an Army strength of 40 000. He explained that the Government’s decision had been made ‘in the light of the successful introduction of the national service scheme and bearing in mind all the various commitments, at home and abroad, which our forces might be required to undertake’.

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Appendix: The national service scheme, 1964-72 | Australian War Memorial (awm.gov.au)

Electric vehicles (EVs) present distinct differences from their traditional petrol-powered counterparts, manifesting in various ways, some apparent (farewell, gas stations!) and others more subtle, such as their susceptibility to cold weather conditions. In the realm of EVs, plummeting temperatures equate to a reduction in driving range, sometimes to a significant degree. It’s crucial for EV owners to grasp the limitations of their vehicle’s range, particularly in cold weather, to avoid the inconvenience of being stranded due to a depleted battery. Fortunately, there are measures one can take during colder seasons to mitigate range anxiety and enhance overall range performance.

Research findings from AAA suggest that EVs may experience a decline of approximately 40% in their range when temperatures plummet from 22 degrees Celsius to 0 degrees Celsius. This decrease in range can be attributed to multiple factors, including the natural loss of battery capacity in colder climates and the heightened energy demand for cabin heating. Additionally, utilizing climate control features like heated seats and steering wheels further drains the vehicle’s battery, thus impacting its overall range.

For instance, an EV with a stated range of 250 miles may see its available range dwindle to a mere 150 miles in freezing temperatures. Notably, this estimation pertains to new EVs; used models are likely to exhibit even lower range capacities due to the inherent degradation of rechargeable batteries over time and with usage. Geotab, a company headquartered in Las Vegas specializing in monitoring battery health in numerous EVs, reports an average annual battery degradation rate of approximately 2.3%.

Photo: 2nd Cavalry Regiment, dismounts from an Australian light armoured vehicle at Townsville Field Training Area, Queensland. photo by Captain Brittany Evans.

Troopers hailing from 2nd Cavalry Regiment recently undertook a series of rigorous anti-armour exercises at the Piccadilly Gate within the expansive Townsville Field Training Area, during the month of February. This strategic endeavour was meticulously designed to assess and fortify their prowess in dismounted operations.

The comprehensive training regimen encompassed a multifaceted approach, incorporating live-fire exercises employing an arsenal comprising the formidable 84mm Carl Gustaf and EF88 Austeyr weaponry. With unwavering focus, both A and B Squadron units honed their skills in executing anti-armour stalks while operating without the support of mounted vehicles.

Under the vigilant guidance of Troop Sergeant Emilio Escobar, the squadrons embarked on a series of meticulously orchestrated section live-fire assaults. These engagements were orchestrated to simulate a full-mission scenario, complete with a meticulously crafted enemy-threat simulation. Through these exercises, the troopers adeptly demonstrated their ability to effectively neutralize enemy armoured assets, thus affirming their readiness for combat.

Speaking to the significance of these anti-armour stalks, Sergeant Escobar underscored their pivotal role in eliminating hostile targets while maintaining a discreet profile through foot mobility. “It is imperative that we master the art of anti-armour stalk training,” remarked Sergeant Escobar. “Our mission is clear: infiltrate, strike decisively, and swiftly withdraw.”

Photo: Trooper Lachlan Hinspeter, of 2nd Cavalry Regiment, dismounts from an Australian light armoured vehicle at Townsville Field Training Area, Queensland. Photo by Captain Brittany Evans.

Indeed, while the cavalry prides itself on its mounted reconnaissance capabilities, the importance of proficiency in dismounted operations cannot be overstated. Sergeant Escobar emphasized the dual nature of their responsibilities, stating, “We must excel in both mounted and dismounted tactics to effectively fulfill our duties as soldiers in the Australian Army.”

By embracing a holistic approach to military readiness, these troopers stand poised to confront any challenge with unparalleled skill and versatility. Through their unwavering dedication to mastering both mounted and dismounted tactics, they epitomize the ethos of excellence that defines the Australian Army.

In a groundbreaking move, the Australian Army and Royal Australian Navy are tapping into the extensive national network of technical trade providers supported by industry, government, and universities to introduce a collaborative technical trades training system.

Termed as a game-changer in trades training capabilities, the Joint Technical Trades Training System (JTTTS) is set to revolutionize the development of critical technical skills for personnel in both the Army and Navy, equipping them with industry-recognized qualifications that are vital for their roles in the field.

The Army kicked off its training under the JTTTS on January 1st, following the signing of a contract between both the Navy and Army with the Wodonga Institute of TAFE (WIOT) last year. This initiative is backed by the National Technical Education Network (NTEN) partners.

Lieutenant Colonel Tim Soper, Commanding Officer of the Army School of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering, highlighted that the JTTTS will broaden training opportunities across various regions and locations, thereby enabling the Defence training system to swiftly adapt to changing capability demands.

“This contract marks a significant stride forward in our quest to foster a highly skilled and flexible force. By embracing a modern and adaptable training framework, we are empowering our personnel to excel in their respective domains and confront the evolving complexities of modern warfare,” LTCOL Soper explained.

The JTTTS collaborates with a wide array of training organizations nationwide, including SW Metro TAFE in Western Australia, Charles Darwin University in the Northern Territory, TAFE Queensland, TAFE NSW, The University of New England, Kinetic IT, and Wodonga TAFE.

Chief JTTTS Officer Adam Jacoby emphasized, “Uniting some of the nation’s most esteemed training institutions in a cooperative and innovative national delivery model will reshape the Defence training landscape, ensuring greater responsiveness to the Australian Defence Force’s immediate and long-term strategic objectives.”

The JTTTS will offer nationally accredited and non-accredited technical training pathways leading to certifications ranging from Certificate II, III, IV, and advanced trade qualifications in areas such as construction, electrical, electronics, engineering, mechanical, and starting from January 2025, aviation maintenance management (mechanical/avionics).

 

Military working dogs have feelings too..

From Targets Down Adults Only sealed section by our special correspondent, Roger Rollover.

Let slip the dogs of war.

ADF Canine in Chief from Roger Rollover, Senior Officers’ Companion Canines Command.

Spot, we’ve been sniffing around each other long enough to understand each other intimately.

As Top Dog (excuse gender specific language) I trust you will be first to howl at the moon over this latest nonsense from CDF-for-life insisting military dog handlers are to be retrained to limit “cultural sensitivity risks” when confronting enemy fighters or terrorists.

I’ve seen better stuff left on footpaths!

“Handlers are expected to ensure their use of ADF Military Working Dogs is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances.

“Those directing or employing ADF MWD teams are expected to be cognisant of any cultural sensitivities in relation to the use of ADF MWD and, where circumstances allow, take active steps to minimise cultural sensitivity risks associated with such use.”

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Let slip the dogs of war | Australian Defence History, Policy and Veterans Issues (targetsdown.blogspot.com)

Vietnam is currently experiencing a surge in global attention, transitioning from its former status of strategic obscurity to becoming a sought-after partner on the international stage. Previously overshadowed and little-known, Vietnam now finds itself courted by prominent figures such as US President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, both of whom made visits to the country last year. This newfound interest culminated in the elevation of the US-Vietnam relationship to the highest level, termed a “comprehensive strategic partnership.”

Vietnam’s proactive engagement is evident through its participation in 18 existing or planned free trade agreements and collaborations on various fronts including climate change, supply chain resilience, and pandemic preparedness. Positioned as a significant player in the escalating US-China rivalry, Vietnam asserts itself in territorial disputes like the South China Sea and emerges as a viable alternative to China for manufacturing outsourcing.

Despite these shifts, Vietnam’s political landscape remains firmly under the control of the Communist Party, maintaining strict suppression of political dissent and opposition. As one of the few remaining Communist, one-party states globally, Vietnam prohibits political opposition and routinely incarcerates dissidents. Decision-making within the upper echelons of the party remains veiled in secrecy.

However, a leaked internal document from Vietnam’s highest decision-making body, the Politburo of the Central Committee, sheds light on the party’s perspectives regarding international partnerships. This document, known as Directive 24, warns against perceived threats to national security posed by external influences brought about by increased international ties. It underscores concerns about the formation of opposition groups and emphasizes the need for vigilance against potential sabotage and political transformation activities.

Interpretations of Directive 24 vary. While some view it as signalling an intensified crackdown on human rights activists and civil society groups, others perceive it as a pre-emptive measure to safeguard against perceived external interference. The timing of the directive, issued following the elevation of US-Vietnam relations and ahead of President Biden’s visit, suggests strategic considerations influenced its release.

Directive 24 underscores the delicate balancing act faced by Vietnam’s leaders as the country emerges as a global manufacturing and trading hub. Unlike China, Vietnam cannot isolate itself behind a digital firewall due to its reliance on foreign investment and technology. While Vietnam has entered into free trade agreements with clauses addressing human and labour rights, the directive indicates reluctance to fully adhere to these provisions.

Critics argue that Vietnam’s commitments to human and labour rights in trade agreements serve as mere veneers, concealing a political system unwilling to respect individual rights. The imprisonment of environmental and climate activists following the signing of significant energy transition partnerships underscores these concerns.

In a historical context, one-party Marxist-Leninist states have transitioned from being perceived as harbingers of progress to becoming anomalies in the contemporary political landscape. Vietnam’s leadership aims to maintain strict political control while exposing its populace to external influences, hoping to sustain economic growth amidst evolving global dynamics.

 

 

READ any contemporary media defence commentary and you’ll experience the destruction of multiple forest hectares, tonnes of CO2 but very little informed understanding of war.

Some experienced, surgically precise analysts, plus this present pocket gem of brilliance naturally excepted.

War evolves in four phases, political, strategic, operational and tactical.

The first two are fought mostly by Group A, politicians with narrow minds, broad hands, thick map pencils and small-scale maps.

Probably the worst by a short head was Austrian, the mere mention of whose name now results in life imprisonment without parole.

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Nous for defence not just game of rhetoric | Australian Defence History, Policy and Veterans Issues (targetsdown.blogspot.com)

This is the INTSUM compiled after the Battle of Nui Le on November 4 1971.

Dave Morris.

CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN ARMY

Page 1 of 5

ANNEX B TO 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn

AFTERACTION REPORT OPERATION IVANHOE

DATED 4 NOV 71

INTELLIGENCE SUMMMARY

References: A. 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn Weekly Intelligence Review 718/41 dated 22 Sep 71

1. 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn Weekly Intelligence Review 718/42 dated 29 Sep 71
2. 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn Weekly Intelligence Review 718/43 dated 6 Oct 71

General Background

1. Early in Sep a number of consistent sniffer readings to the East of the NUI LE and in the vicinity of the NUI SAO feature, indicated the possible presence of an unidentified enemy group – thought to be elements from 33 NVA Regt.
2. As a result, D Coy 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn was redeployed from the area of old FSB ASH (YS 3682) to the East of Courtenay Plantation into old FSB TRISH (YS 5288); and commenced a search of the country to the North and East, later progressing to the West and South covering the NUI LE area.
3. On 10 Sep VR aircraft reported a number of tracks leading into the Province from the North.
4. On the 14 Sep at YS 512871 D Coy contacted 2 enemy carrying packs who withdrew South/West along a track. The next day they contacted 2 enemy scouts, killing one at YS515867. The enemy was moving East – West using a compass, and a track for a squad sized group was located running North – South in the area. The enemy KIA carried no identification.
5. American forces had experienced numerous contacts in the vicinity of NUI HOT with elet:1emts of Regt HQ until 16 Sep. However, from then on there had been a lack of contact in the area.
6. VR.ac also revealed a number of tracks in the SUOI RAN, SUOI LE area at this time. It is likely that 3 Bn had moved from its base area East of BAO BINH down by the SUOI NHAC into the Province.
7. During the early hours 19 Sep 626 RF Coy outpost (YS 461834) received an ABF of 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, and 82mm mortars. 3 RF were WIA when several RR rounds impacted inside the post. The use of that calibre RR indicated the presence of C17 Recoilless Rifle Coy (max str 20). 82mm Mortars are held by both C16 1-lortar Coy (max str 25) and C12 Heavy Weapons Coy – 3 Bn, (max str 30). VR as reported tracks to and from the firing point/base plate to the East.
8. Shortly after a light sapper attack was launched against the village of NGAI GIAO (YS 463794) by approx. 10-12 enemy, who threw 3 satchel charges at outlying buildings.

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9. However, the group most likely responsible for the sapper attack is thought to have been C3 Coy 1 Bn 274 VC Regt – who had been allocated the task of “occupyingNGAI GIA0 according to documents CIA by 1 ATF ptl on 18 Aug 71.
10. Subsequent attacks on the village on 28 Sep and 10 Oct (after elements from 33 NVA Regt arc assessed to have departed from the area) would seem to back such reasoning. However, the capability of the VC during the attacks did not appear to be high, so it is more likely that local NGAI GIAO) ordistrict (CHAU DUC) forces were involved (Interrogation of PW’s 1rom these two forces, CL on 20 Oct, tends to support that the attack. were undertaken by them: not elements from either Regt).
11. On the morning 20 Sep, 4 AFCs from 1 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt returning North along Route 2 were ambushed at YS 461821 by approx. 20 enemy, who were dug in, fired RPG 2s and 7s at the vehicles. One enemy was KIA. He was carrying a greater than normal amount of ammo (174rds 7.62mm short) but no identification marks/ documents. Again, characteristic of 33 NVA unit.12.
12. The amount, and types of ammo employed by the enemy during the attacks on 19/20 Sep (75mm RR, 82mm Mor, RPG 2 and 7) indicated the presence of a regular unit, operating East of Route 2
13. Agent reports substantiated the existence of such a group.

Base Areas

14. It was apparent that Regt HQ 33 NVA Regt, anxious to evade from 3 Bde (US) operations, had moved South from the NUI HOT area into PHOUC TUY Province.
15. Bn was also moved from its base area East of BAI BINH, into the province.
16. Both groups may have thought that the Australian Forces no longer operate1 in the area. From Jun-Aug 71 there v:as no sizeable ground coverage East or South of Courtenay Plantation – all Coy sized operations conducted since Aug had managed to keep resupply to a minimum, thus not advertising their tasks unduly.

17• Combined with the announcement of the impending withdrawal of Australian Forces (which it is assessed, 33 Rgt. HQ would have known of by early Sep) and pressure from 3 Bde: a new area. was reconnoitered.

18. An area was located near the NUI LE – SAO features. It was located near known RSG re-supply routes, had good canopy for protection against aerial observation – which had previously contributed to the Regt1s considerable casualties. There were high features to assist with communications and observation. The SUOI YOUERT, and SUOI TAM BO offered good water supply and combined with the surrounding terrain to restrict the employment of allied amour in the area.

The Threat

19.The establishing of an operating base in this area would provide relatively easy access to the villages and outposts of DUC THANH District.

20.There was also the agent report that elements of 33 Regt would support operations of 274 Regt along Route 2, though this seemed doubtful.

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21 The strength of 33 NVA Regt HQ and all Sp Coys was assessed to be 378 and 3 Bn was held at 300 strong. 1 Bn (str 300) was not thought to be in the area, having been released from its task of providing security for Regt HQ. It was identified in central LONG KNANH Province from documents CIA by 984 RF Coy on 15/16 Sep.

22. Regt HQ 274 VC Regt was, at the time, 300 strong; and 1 Bn totalled 235 persons.

Enemy Losses

23.A list of enemy casualties and captured weapons is attached as Appendix 1.

Installations and caches

23.Installations and caches located by the unit are summerised as Annex E.

Captured Equipment

25. A summary of equipment, including munitions captured, is attached as Appendix 2.

Energy Activities/Tactics

26. On 20 Sep D Coy killed 1NVA Ln a contact at YS 51185 although no identification was apparent.

27• Elements of D Coy were engaged by RPG and SA fire on the morning of 21 Sep in the vie YS 513857. Throughout the 21 Sep repeated air and artillery strikes were employed in support of D Coy as a series of assaults were launched upon (what was later found to be) the Western most bunker system of a 4-system complex, large enough (24 completed bunkers with 15 prepared bunker sites) to accommodate the

bulk of 3 Bn 33 NVA Regt.

CONFIDENTIAL

28 · The NVA defenders employed good fire control – seeking out D Coy1s machine guns, and areas from which commands were being shouted. Most bunkers had fire lanes cut (up to 5ft in width) to cover the most likely approaches and were sited to be mutually supporting. The majority of CHICOM grenades thrown at D Coy fortunately did not detonate.

29 Advantage was taken of the good canopy cover and high ground to the NVJ, North and NE of the complex to employ intensive ground fire against supporting helicopter fire teams and Jade ac throughout the day.

30 As D Coy extracted its casualties and moved out of the bunker systems to allow for further sp fire, it received SA fire on its flanks from mobile groups of NVA who had come from other systems within the complex. This follow up of D Coy continued to the perimeter of its NDP, which was also under fire, from a separate 14 bunker complex 400 meters SW from the contact area.

31 Fire from this system was mainly directed from an OP (later a 30ft ladder against a suitable tree was found during the search of the system). Harassing fire continued into the NDP until well after darkness.

CONFIDENTIAL

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32 The reason for the close follow up of D Coy appears to have been an attempt to prevent the employment of close aerial and artillery support. Employing an NVA tactic of withdrawing in the direction from which they are under attack, incorporating flanking movement/harassment. Thirdly, the NVA were concerned that

D Coy was moving (to its NDP) close to the 14-bunker system, and went to assist its inhabitants evacuate the system, by harassing D Coy .

33 A total of 9 NVA were confirmed as being accounted for by D Coy during the day of 21 Sep.

34 A heavily used track subsequently located by D Coy 3 RAR revealed that the NVA had departed the complex to the North (probably the HQ group), whilst a heavier track to the Northeast but South (in YS 5284) of the complex, was the probable route of the follow up/withdrawal force.

35  B Coy followed up an insulated communication/navigation wire contacted and killed a member identified as being from C9 Coy 3 Bn at YS 487833 during the morning of 21 Sep.

36 Subsequent follow up/search located many freshly cut – recently well used tracks in the area – and during the afternoon a further contact developed, with elements of the Coy receiving 60mm mortar fire, and a further NVA soldier was confirmed as killed, as a B Coy subunit (4 Pl) moved to assist members of the coy wounded during the shelling.

37 Supporting aircraft again reported ground fire from this area. From what appears to have been a suspected NVA mortar base plate position that was engaged.by artillery, a secondary explosion was reported in YS 5083. (Each Coy of C10, C11 have at least one 60mr.1 mortar within its organization). found during the search of the system).

38 The insulated wire located by B Coy in the vicinity of the ABFs, and ambushing position on Route 2, and through the subsequent contact areas (YS 4682, YS 4683, 4883, 4983) was probably used as a night navigation aid and communications.

link between attacking/observing elements and HQ 33 NVA Regt used similar insulated wire linking such positions to the South of LONG BINH for their attacks during TET 1969.

39 Direction of the withdrawal of the NVA (assessed to be composed of elements from the Regt Sp Coys C16 mor, C17 and some C20 Si6s and elements from 3 Bn probably for protection) from the B Coy area was East to the SUOI YOUZRT then NE, and ESE. Tracks were later located in the area by C Coy searching further to the East.

40. A NVA soldier carrying documents mentioning C17 RR, C19 Engr and C20 Sigs Coys of 33 NVA Regtwas KIA by Sp Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt of 21 Sep well to the NE at YS 637873 during an abortive ambush on Route 2 against 1 Tp A Sqn.
41. Other incidents during the operation included the detonating of two AT mines (consisting of approx. 60lbs CHICOM explosive) by two APCs of 1 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regtin the Courtenay Rubber on 25 Sep 71. It is likely that the mines were placed in position by elements from C2 (ex A2) Engr Coy BA I.DNG and CHAU DUC Engr Cell who were based just to the South of the Plantation near XA BANG in AUG 71.

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 5 of 5 Pages

42 C Coy located a cache on a platform in water-logged country at YS 473869. There were 25 x 15 litre bags of rice – which appeared to have been in place about one month – probably stores belonging 814 RSG or C5 Coy of J85 Tpt Bn who have operated in the area recently. An old German rifle was also located in the vicinity by C Coy, likely to have been guerilla equipment.

Assessment

43 The building of good bunker systems, and the cutting of tracks to facilitate rapid redeployment of subunits in the vicinity of HUI SAO/Route 2, indicated that Regt HQ and 3 Bn had intended to establish a semi-permanent base for future operations in that area of PHOUC TUY Province. Indications are that the NVA group intend to remain in the area, had it not been for the reaction of 1 ATF and sub­sequent losses sustained by the NVA in action.

44. There is no doubt that the quick retaliatory reaction by AFCs from 1Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt when ambushed on 20 Sep; and aggressive action by D Coy and B Coy with plentiful close air and artillery support of 21 Sep 71; were responsible in forcing the NVA to abandon their efforts (which had been considerable) to harass the district and return to more secure surroundings North of the Province boundary.