The launch of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 confronted the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with a new geopolitical reality. Once described as “braindead” by French President Emmanuel Macron, the alliance was jolted into action by a threat that seemed consigned to history—a full-scale conventional war in Europe.
Military leaders began issuing warnings of a resurgent Russia, stressing the need for NATO allies to be prepared within three, five, or eight years. Romanian Defence Chief Gheorghita Vlad underscored the gravity of the situation, stating in February 2024, “The Russian Federation has become a problem for the world order, for democracy. It is not just a war with Ukraine but a war against the democratic world.”
Following decades of post-Cold War downsizing and years of focusing on counterinsurgency rather than traditional military threats, NATO’s readiness for this new challenge has come into question. European defence budgets shrank during the “peace dividend” years, and the shadow of former U.S. President Donald Trump’s potential return to the White House adds uncertainty to NATO’s cohesion.
According to Gordon B. Davis, a senior fellow at the Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and NATO’s former deputy assistant secretary general, NATO’s current capabilities are not sufficient to defeat Russia without significant costs. However, NATO’s collective strength still makes it a formidable force.
As of 2024, NATO’s 32 members, especially its European contingent, face challenges such as ammunition shortages, fragmented defence industries, and limited air defence coverage. Yet, in many aspects, even the European portion of NATO can outgun Russian forces. NATO, excluding the U.S., has approximately 1.9 million active personnel, 2,400 combat-ready aircraft, and 6,650 tanks, compared to Russia’s 1.1 million troops, 1,370 aircraft, and 2,000 tanks, according to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
The accession of Sweden and Finland further strengthened NATO, adding well-trained militaries and extending the alliance’s defence line with Russia by over 1,300 kilometres. This expansion puts additional pressure on Russia’s defence capabilities.
NATO also possesses superior long-range firepower, with advanced jets like the F-35, and more modern airpower compared to Russia. Ed Arnold, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), remarked that Russia’s tactics in Ukraine would likely be ineffective against NATO forces, which could swiftly decimate Russian troops in a short, intense conflict.
However, a quick war may not be what NATO would face. The Russian state and society, as demonstrated during the first year of the invasion, appear capable of enduring initial losses and regrouping for a prolonged conflict. NATO planners view the Baltic states as particularly vulnerable to attack, given their proximity to Russia and Belarus, and the strategic Suwalki Gap remains a crucial concern.
While NATO’s firepower could overwhelm Russian forces, Davis cautioned that NATO might still suffer significant losses, particularly from Russian bombers, drones, and submarines targeting NATO territory. The balance of power between the two forces remains uncertain, hinging on political will, resources, and the endurance of Western societies in a potential long war.