The Royal Australian Navy has accelerated Naval Strike Missile installation in Surface Combatants which culminated in the 18 July live firing demonstration off the coast of Hawaii during Exercise RIMPAC 2024.
For over 80 years, the knowledge and skills of Australia’s World War II Commandos and Special Operations operators have been preserved and enhanced by the part-time Commandos of the 1st Commando Regiment. This regiment is supported by a small cadre of regular Army personnel, typically from the Special Air Service Regiment and more recently from the 2nd Commando Regiment. It remains the only Army Reserve unit to have deployed on warlike operations since World War II.
Since the first Green Beret was awarded in July 1956, it is estimated that nearly 10,000 male soldiers, along with a small number of women, have qualified for this coveted beret, meeting the rigorous skills and physical requirements initially based on the Royal Marine Commando and British Army Commando standards.
Recently, Special Operations Command has proposed changes to assign the 1st Commando Regiment a new role in Special Warfare, also known as Unconventional Warfare or Guerrilla Warfare. This was the original purpose for raising the initial two part-time Commando Companies in 1955, though it was not widely known for security reasons at that time.
As a result of these new initiatives, it is intended that new part-time and full-time members of the 1st Commando Regiment will no longer be called Commandos and will no longer be eligible to be awarded the Green Beret.
CLICK LINK to sign the petition
Petition · Stop 1st Commando Regiment losing their Green Berets. – Australia · Change.org
I am glad the minister made that last comment, because as somebody with a background in science and a qualification in science, and as a former experimental test pilot in the military—in fact, having commanded Australia’s flight test centre and worked in a systems engineering environment where we were very much based on facts, data and engineering, but with a good dose of modelling in there as well—I’m actually very familiar with the sort of approach that the CSIRO has taken.
As the minister indicated, we do have things like Senate estimates, and I did take the opportunity to go to Senate estimates to speak to the CSIRO about the GenCost report.
It may come as a surprise to the minister that, when I asked the head of the CSIRO to speak about the GenCost report, having made it clear to the committee that I intended to appear at those estimates hearings to ask about the GenCost report—therefore, the expectation is that the agencies that are being quizzed will bring the appropriate officials in order to be able to answer detailed questions at estimates—I was told that the appropriate officials were not there, and the only responses that I got to some reasonably detailed questions were very generic.
So, contrary to what the minister has indicated, estimates actually proved completely useless in terms of interrogating the CSIRO over the GenCost report. I can’t speak to the motivation of CSIRO in not bringing those officials, but what it meant was that members of the Senate, on behalf of the taxpayers of Australia, were not able to scrutinise them in any detail.
If we took the minister’s contention that he just outlined then and applied it more broadly, there would be no point in having committees of the parliament at all. In matters to do with health, for example, we might ask the AMA to draft our policy and scrutinise it. In matters to do with defence, we would rely on the defence department and perhaps defence industry, and there would be no point in having any scrutiny on behalf of the Australian taxpayer.
Yet the minister knows full well, because he has been a member of committees in this place, that the whole function of committees and the Senate committee process—getting a range of witnesses who are stakeholders affected by policy or who are subject matter experts who understand the technical details, whether in health, in economics or in defence; you name it—is so that we can unpack and understand what is behind a policy or a piece of evidence.
The last point I’ll make on this, since the minister has so kindly given me this introductory runway to approach this issue, relates to the 2019 House of Representatives inquiry into the possibility of a nuclear power industry. This is going back to the 2018 GenCost report. I will look at the Hansard records from that, from Wednesday 16 October 2019.
I respect the CSIRO, as somebody who has a science degree; I respect the whole discipline of science, which is observation, measurement and proof. But when the CSIRO were quizzed in this parliamentary inquiry about the GenCost report—and I’ll paraphrase here, but those of you who would like to read it can pull up the Hansard from Wednesday 16 October 2019 for the House of Representatives Standing Committee on the Environment and Energy—essentially the narrative went like this: CSIRO said, ‘We don’t have any expertise in electricity generation by nuclear energy,’ so the committee asked, ‘Well, where did you get the figures that you used in your report, then?’ They said, ‘Well, we contracted an external consultant to provide those figures for us.’ If you look through the Hansard you’ll see the committee met on a sequence of days.
Why did they do that? Because, as each piece of evidence unfolded, they dug a bit deeper.
They had that consultant come in and they said, ‘Describe for us where you got the information from.’ What the consultant said was, ‘Well, we don’t have any expertise in nuclear power generation, so we went to the website of the World Nuclear Association to find information.’ The following day there was another hearing, this time with a representative from the World Nuclear Association, and the committee asked them, ‘Did you have this figure on your website?’ They said, ‘No, we didn’t have it on our website, and, more to the point, we think it is grossly inflated and unrepresentative of what the true costs would be.’
To the CSIRO’s great credit, they took all that on board, and I think they have been far more robust in how they’ve approached it since. But, to directly address the minister’s point, the benefit of a committee process with a range of witnesses that were able to challenge the assumptions that have been made was that it highlighted that the 2018 GenCost report was not based on any robust analysis of the facts of the cost of electricity generation, let alone any analysis of the likely price to the consumer.
I will leave that there, but I’m hoping that that completely debunks the minister’s assertion that there is no value in a parliamentary inquiry.
Estimates has not worked—and he proposed it would—and a parliamentary committee did highlight that, in this particular domain, the CSIRO did not have expertise in the paths they went down and that they delivered figures that were proved, on the public record, to not be robust.
Why do I support this?
Partly it’s because I believe in that committee process, but it’s also partly that, as someone who has worked in an engineering environment using modelling and as someone who has a qualification in science, I recognise that the GenCost report is largely a modelling activity, as opposed to science. If you search the PDF of the latest GenCost report, the word ‘assumption’ appears some 54 times, and, like in most modelling, they’ve had to make assumptions.
There are a range of assumptions in GenCost that the CSIRO themselves identify as not necessarily representative of the complete suite of factors to be considered.
I have some empathy for them; it’s a complex problem, but there are a few things that the Australian public need to be aware of. When Mr Bowen and others cite this as the be-all and end-all—the gospel according to the CSIRO that shall not be challenged—it needs to be said that it is a modelling exercise with assumptions based on an incomplete set of data.
There are other expert bodies in Australia and around the world who have also done modelling and come up with quite different answers to the same questions.
That’s why we should give the Australian people the opportunity to have different experts in the field address their modelling, their assumptions and, more importantly, their lived experience so that the Australian people can decide whether this is something that we should be moving towards.
The first point is that this modelling is not designed to understand the most effective way to get cheap and reliable electricity to the Australian consumer, whether that be mum and dad at home, a small business or an industrial sector that will probably go offshore if the power prices continue to increase.
In paragraph 1.1.1 of the latest GenCost report, which describes the roles the CSIRO and AEMO had in the report, it says ‘to provide an update of current electricity generation and storage cost’.
It’s not about highlighting the cheapest way to get electricity.
That paragraph also talks about the levelised cost of electricity, which is all about the factors affecting the cost to generation, as opposed to the full system’s costs.
The third point I would make is that they highlight, in paragraph 1.2 on page 16 of the GenCost report:
As discussed in Graham (2018) it is not possible to undertake spreadsheet type modelling to create a transparent but accurate estimate of the cost of integrating renewables.
This is one of the significant factors that affect the analysis of whether a renewables based approach can be comparable in terms of delivering reliability and low cost to the consumer versus baseload type approaches, whether that be high-flow rivers providing hydro or things like nuclear power. So they’re saying here that they can’t provide a transparent and accurate estimate costs of integrating renewables.
The report states:
If it were, this would have been the preferred method of implementation in GenCost.
Again, they quote Graham:
Graham (2018) concluded an electricity system modelling approach must be applied, where the details of the calculations are written in code that call on proprietary optimisation algorithms which unfortunately results in a loss of transparency.
I’m not saying that the CSIRO is in any way being malign in how they’re approaching this, but their chosen vendor, their chosen model, their chosen algorithms and their chosen assumptions are but one set that feeds into a model that gives an outcome of cost degeneration.
Other equally expert bodies—and I’m talking here about bodies like the International Energy Agency, the OECD, or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and their subsidiary, the NEA, the Nuclear Energy Agency—have worked together over a number of years to model not the cost to generate but the cost to the consumer.
In terms of that simple measure, the levelised cost of electricity, which even GenCost recognises is not a suitable cost for this analysis and comparison, the OECD report that came out in April 2022 looks at a systems-wide approach and demonstrates very clearly that what they call ‘long-run nuclear power’, even on a levelised cost of electricity basis, is the cheapest form of electricity.
If you run a plant for a long time, it becomes, over the life of that asset, the cheapest way to generate power. They also highlight in that analysis that even new-build nuclear is on a par with grid-scale renewables but is cheaper than others. For example, it’s actually cheaper than rooftop or offshore wind et cetera.
If people who are interested look at pages 35 to 37 of that OECD report, they then break down the elements into the generating costs, the systems costs and the broader environmental costs. They highlight that, as we seek to move to curb emissions, we will probably get to 2030 with rising, but not unaffordable, power prices. But, if we seek to get to net zero by 2050 just using variable renewables with firming by things like batteries, as more coal and gas comes out of the system in order to achieve net zero, prices will go up exponentially, and their conclusion is that it is unaffordable.
This is not the coalition saying that.
This is the OECD and the International Energy Agency.
That is why people like the IPCC are saying we need to have nuclear power as part of the mix, and that’s why so many nations around the world are looking to double or triple the amount of nuclear power generation they have.
So another point I’d make is that, despite the government’s claim that nuclear is the most expensive form of energy, the lived experience of people in countries like Canada says otherwise. If you look at some of the information coming out of Canada, you can see that nuclear is even cheaper than hydro and is certainly cheaper than gas, wind, solar and bioenergy, in terms of how the Energy Board in Ontario manages things.
That’s partly because of the broader costs that variable renewables have in terms of the additional infrastructure.
My last point will be around the Net Zero Australia project done by three universities and a consultancy, which highlighted that the cost of all the additional transmission and firming as well as new generation is going to cost us in the order of $1.2 to $1.5 trillion by 2030, and $7 to $9 trillion by 2060.
The nuclear option is actually far cheaper than the variable path the Albanese government has us on.
Discover Australia’s cutting-edge military advancement with the Boxer Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (CRV)! In this video, we delve into the pivotal role of the Boxer CRV in modernizing Australia’s Armoured Fighting Vehicle capability under LAND 400 Phase 2. Designed to enhance the safety, security, and protection of Australian troops, the Boxer CRV replaces the long-serving Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV), providing heightened levels of protection, firepower, and mobility. Versatile Deployment: From littoral environments to complex urban settings, the Boxer CRV ensures operational versatility, supporting missions ranging from peacekeeping to close combat. Strategic Contract: Rheinmetall Defence Australia has been tasked with delivering and supporting 211 Boxer 8×8 CRVs for the Australian Army, split into Block I and Block II phases. Current Status: Block I has already delivered 25 CRVs, including reconnaissance and multi-purpose variants, demonstrating exceptional performance and availability in Army operations. Future Build: Block II, comprising 186 CRVs, is currently undergoing design and testing phases, with production centred at Rheinmetall Defence Australia’s Military Vehicle Centre of Excellence in Redbank, Queensland. The majority of Block II CRVs will be assembled at Rheinmetall Defence Australia’s state-of-the-art facility, boosting local defence manufacturing capabilities. Stay tuned as we explore how the Boxer CRV reinforces Australia’s defence posture and supports future military operations. Don’t forget to like, comment, and subscribe for more updates on Australia’s defence advancements!
ED: See Food Shortage video after reading this article.
The Israeli military announced it bombed sites in Yemen linked to the Iran-backed Houthi militias in retaliation for a deadly drone attack on Tel Aviv on Friday. On Saturday, Israeli forces targeted “military targets” over 1600 km away in Yemen’s port city of Hodeidah in response to “hundreds of aerial threats,” including the attack that killed an Israeli man and wounded 10 others.
This marks the first time Israel has publicly acknowledged striking Yemen amidst escalating attacks from the Houthis. The military claimed this operation as one of the furthest strikes ever conducted by the Israeli Air Force.
Houthi spokesperson Mohammed Abdulsalam condemned the strikes, calling them “blatant Israeli aggression against Yemen” and claiming they targeted civilian infrastructure, oil tanks, and an electricity station in the strategic port city. He argued that these actions aimed to increase the suffering of the Yemeni people and pressure Yemen into halting its support for Gaza. He asserted that these attacks would only “increase the determination” of the Yemeni people and their armed forces.
Mohamed Ali al-Houthi of Yemen’s Supreme Political Council and Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree both vowed impactful retaliation against Israel. The Ministry of Health in Sanaa reported that 80 people were wounded, most with severe burns. Houthi-affiliated al Masirah TV later reported that the Israeli strikes killed three people and injured 87.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the strike was a direct response to the Houthis’ attack on Tel Aviv, which killed 50-year-old Israeli citizen Yevgeny Ferder and injured 10 others. Netanyahu emphasized the strategic importance of the port used by the Houthis for military purposes and as an entry point for weapons supplied by Iran. He declared that Israel’s reach knows no bounds.
Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant noted that the Houthis have struck Israel “over 200 times.” He affirmed that Israel’s response to harm against its citizens would be decisive and far-reaching.
The drone attack by Houthi rebels in Tel Aviv resulted in one fatality and at least 10 injuries near the US Embassy early Friday. Despite previous interceptions of projectiles from Yemen, an “error” in air defences led to the drone reaching its target without triggering air raid sirens.
Since January, British and American forces have been targeting Houthi positions in Yemen in response to attacks on commercial shipping. These strikes, intended as retaliation for Israel’s actions in Gaza, have had limited deterrence on the Iran-backed group. Concurrently, Israeli strikes in Gaza killed at least 13 people in refugee camps overnight, as ceasefire talks in Cairo showed progress.
Israel launched intense bombardments and a crippling siege on Gaza in retaliation for the October 7 Hamas attacks, which resulted in over 1,000 Israeli casualties and more than 250 hostages. Palestinian health officials report that Israeli bombings have since killed more than 38,000 people, mostly women and children. The United Nations warns of famine due to severe food shortages.
After decades of war and with the imminent fall of Saigon in 1975, a humanitarian crisis was unfolding in South Vietnam.
As Communist tanks neared the borders, Australians and Americans were called on to evacuate thousands of South Vietnamese, including many war orphans.
A humanitarian mission named Operation Babylift was launched to take orphans to Australia and the United States.
During the refugee evacuation, eight RAAF C-130 Hercules and two C-47 Dakotas were dispatched.
Among the hundreds of orphaned children was a 5-month-old, 4-kilo malnourished baby who was adopted by a family in Berri, South Australia. He is now Warrant Officer Class 1 (WO1) Darren Wasley.
Today, the actions of those during Operation Babylift are not lost on him, knowing the airlift gave him a new lease of life.
Almost 50 years later, on 3 July, WO1 Wasley met 87-year-old Val Lawrence, an Air Force nurse who was aboard one of the RAAF aircraft headed for Saigon, at an RSL-run nursing home in Adelaide.
‘Meeting RAAF nurse Val Lawrence was surreal; it was like meeting your midwife,’ WO1 Wasley said.
‘There were so many children, but we now know she was on my flight.’
Ms Lawrence said she was elated when she first found out one of the orphans was coming to meet her. She had never had the opportunity to see any of the rescued children.
She said her actions on the mission were only a small part of a bigger picture.
‘I always find myself wondering where the kids are today and what they’re doing,’ Ms Lawrence said.
‘These days my memories of it all are kind of sketchy; it was 50 years ago. It all happened so quickly. I was one of the four nurses and there were so many children.
‘I am so grateful that Darren came to meet me and I will cherish this moment.’
About 200 orphans were evacuated to Australia. It was not long after the last flight on 17 April 1975, that North Vietnamese Army tanks rolled into Saigon.
Growing up, WO1 Wasley always knew he was different because he did not look like his parents.
‘They were white Aussies, I was not,’ he said.
In his teens, WO1 Wasley was an Army cadet with an interest in war history, so he joined the Army in 1994 as a reserve rifleman.
After he decided to go full-time, a knee injury during training at Kapooka shifted his career to a role in the Armoured Corps, where he spent the majority of his time at 3/4 Cav Regt in Townsville.
Today, he is the Honours and Awards secretary for Army Headquarters and is studying at the Australian War College.
WO1 Wasley plans to visit Val Lawrence again and is hoping to meet some of her family.
Turning Points in Public Perception
The period from the Tet Offensive in early 1968 to the Moratorium demonstrations of May 1970 marked a crucial turning point in the Vietnam War, particularly in the battle for American public opinion. This era witnessed the downfall of President Lyndon Johnson and the emergence of President Richard Nixon’s Vietnamization strategy. As Americans commemorate anniversary of these events, there has been a renewed focus on re-examining the war, its strategies, and its impacts.
Reevaluating the War: Years of Debate
The last fifty or so years have seen extensive political debate and scholarly research regarding the Vietnam War. Documentaries like Ken Burns and Lynn Novick’s The Vietnam War and books like Max Hastings’ Vietnam: An Epic Tragedy, 1945-1975 have brought these discussions to a broader audience. They reflect on how the war was conducted by the United States, its impact on American politics and society, and provide deeper insights into Hanoi’s perspective and the internal dynamics within South Vietnam.
Understanding the Main Participants
Significant details have emerged about the main participants in the Vietnam War. The United States’ military, political, and diplomatic strategies have been scrutinized, alongside the profound effects of the war on American society. Recent research has shed light on Hanoi’s war efforts, revealing how leaders like Ho Chi Minh were sidelined by more ruthless figures such as Le Duan. There is also an emerging recognition of genuine nationalists within South Vietnam who feared the future under a communist regime.
The Overlooked Regional Context
Much of the literature on the Vietnam War has been produced by Americans, focusing primarily on American perspectives. However, from an Australian viewpoint, the regional context is critical and often underrepresented. Two elements deserve particular attention:
The Domino Theory Revisited
The domino theory posited that a communist victory in South Vietnam would lead to a spread of communism throughout Southeast Asia. While Laos and Cambodia did fall to communist regimes after Saigon’s collapse in 1975, the theory was often discredited. However, in the mid-1960s, the theory influenced Australia’s decision to commit combat forces, driven by concerns over the stability of Malaysia and Indonesia amidst regional tensions and the threat posed by the Indonesian Communist Party.
Changing Regional Dynamics
By 1968, regional dynamics had shifted dramatically. Indonesia had transitioned to a Western-oriented regime, tensions in Malaysia had subsided, and the formation of ASEAN in 1967 marked a new era of regional cooperation. These changes, unforeseen in 1965, suggest that the regional impact of an earlier American withdrawal from Vietnam might not have been as catastrophic as initially feared. This perspective is supported by Singapore’s leaders, who argue that the American intervention delayed the fall of Saigon, allowing regional nations to better prepare for the new balance of power.
Australia’s Strategic Calculations
Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War was driven by strategic concerns distinct from those of the United States. While the US was focused on containing communism globally, Australia was more concerned with regional stability. The commitment to Vietnam was influenced by a policy of ‘forward defence,’ which had previously proven effective in the Malayan Emergency and Indonesian Confrontation. However, Australia’s lack of detailed knowledge about mainland Southeast Asia and overestimation of American capabilities led to strategic miscalculations.
Lessons for Modern Strategy
The Vietnam War offers several lessons for contemporary Australian strategists. Effective intervention requires a deep understanding of one’s own capabilities, the enemy, the ally, and the historical context of the region. These lessons are crucial for evaluating future commitments and ensuring that strategic decisions are based on comprehensive knowledge and realistic assessments.
In reflecting on the Vietnam War, it is evident that both the costs and benefits of military interventions must be carefully weighed. For Australia, this means considering regional dynamics and maintaining a balance between alliance obligations and independent strategic interests. The war remains a potent reminder of the complexities of international conflicts and the importance of informed decision-making in foreign policy.
The Australian Government has reaffirmed its commitment to providing practical support to veterans with today’s announcement of $4.731 million in grants for local advocacy services.
The funding has been awarded through the Building Excellence in Support and Training (BEST) grants program, and is shared among 102 ex-service organisations (ESOs) across Australia.
The annual grants program helps ESO advocates to provide veterans with advice and assistance about entitlements, health and wellbeing support, services and claims.
ESOs of all sizes and from every state and territory were among the successful applicants, reflecting the diversity of organisations dedicated to supporting veterans and families in their communities.
Local ESOs play a vital role in supporting the veteran community, providing advocacy services and support to current and former ADF personnel.
BEST grant funding provides a contribution towards the salary of compensation advocates and their administrative support staff, equipment and administrative expenses associated with the delivery of advocacy services to veterans and families.
When veterans’ claims are submitted with all required documentation, it allows for greater efficiency, faster processing, and improved access to services and entitlements.
More details, including a full list of the BEST grant 2024-2025 recipients, is available on the GrantConnect website
With compliments
Korean War: North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950. This war
has never ended. The Armistice was signed on July 27,1953.
2024 KVAA commemoration service; July 27 2024
https://www.shrine.org.au/korean-veterans-association
Ralph Wollmer
Police are investigating the theft and vandalism of an Australian Defence Force (ADF) 40M truck, which was stolen from a barracks and abandoned in a Brisbane street on State of Origin night.
The truck was discovered in the car park of Mitchelton Youth Club on Thursday morning, covered in graffiti. Phrases like “F–k NSW” and “Go QLD” were spray-painted in orange, along with “thanks” on the front and “party bus get on” on the back.
The incident followed Queensland’s tough loss to New South Wales in the State of Origin decider on Wednesday night. Queensland Police reported that two men accessed private property around 2:25 am and stole the vehicle, which was found shortly after in Mitchelton.
Police cordoned off the area and conducted investigations inside the vehicle before it was towed away in the afternoon. The Gallipoli Barracks at Enoggera is located just a few streets away from where the truck was found.
A Defence spokesman confirmed that both Defence and the Queensland Police Service (QPS) are investigating the incident, but no further details were provided.