China’s Gunboat Diplomacy and Australia’s Defence Readiness

The passage of a three-ship naval task group off Australia’s east coast has been dismissed by some as a routine operation in international waters, a stance echoed by Chinese officials who accuse Australian politicians of “deliberately hyping” the issue. However, this event highlights broader concerns regarding Australia’s defence preparedness.

Many commentators have pointed to Australia’s naval shipbuilding shortcomings, citing generations of failure to meet necessary production numbers. The current shipbuilding program will not take effect until the 2030s, leaving a concerning capability gap. Yet, a more pressing question arises: what if the Chinese navy did enter Australian waters, or worse, sought to interfere with air and maritime movements by declaring an air defence identification zone, as they frequently do around Taiwan? Could Australia respond effectively?

The answer lies in the core principles of Australian defence policy in 2025. Military strategy is built on three pillars: ends, ways, and means. The 2024 National Defence Strategy outlines deterrence as a key objective, relying on diplomacy, economic strength, and military power. To support this, Australia must have an operational plan to deny open access to its waters, including a rapidly deployable maritime task group comprising frigates, submarines, and supply ships, alongside air power from the Royal Australian Air Force.

However, the critical issue remains the means. Australia’s defence capabilities will not fully materialise until the next decade, creating a shortfall in military readiness. While plans for new ships, submarines, and long-range missiles are crucial beyond 2030, the immediate need for an effective deterrence strategy remains.

One potential interim solution lies with the Australian Army. A rapid acquisition of land-based anti-ship missile systems could provide a credible deterrent against hostile naval incursions. Similar to Ukraine’s success in countering the Russian Black Sea Fleet, land-based strike capabilities could enhance Australia’s ability to protect its waters before new naval assets become operational.

The recent presence of a Chinese naval task group near Australian waters underscores the urgency of implementing an effective military strategy today, not years from now. Australia must address its defence vulnerabilities with immediate and pragmatic solutions to ensure national security in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific region.