My thoughts of the Bretherton Report – letter to SAS newsletter
ED: Bob Buick gave me permission to post this article he wrote about the Bretherton Report
20240612
To: Martin Hamilton-Smith
From: Bob Buick MM
Subject: Contribution to SASR Magazine
I have been invited to contribute to your prestigious magazine and voice my opinion on special forces, the ADF Legal System as I understand it and the Legal proceedings against 2 Sqn warriors during a deployment to Afghanistan and the military law, we had during my Infantry service in 1959-1980.
My service included two overseas deployments in Malaysia with 2RAR 1961-3 and Vietnam with 6RAR 1966-7. I was the Platoon Sergeant of 11 Platoon at Long Tan 18th of August 1966, there is no need to include the battle details not necessary to mention that the platoon suffered 100% casualties over the tour of one Officer and thirty-three Other Ranks, the only platoon to suffer those total casualties. It was an exciting year with lots of highs and lows.
Military Law and Justice in the AMF were detailed in the Manual of Military Law with the AMR&O (Australia Military Regulations and Orders) which was virtually a copy of the British Army system adapted to the Australian Army system. There were certain offences not included and the use of drugs could be referred to the Military Police and dealt with within the service, including murder. It is my understanding that AMF lawyers wanted military law Army, Navy and Air Forces combined into one book and that happened with the creation of the ADF in the 1980s under a Labor government.
So, what changed? The AMF was cast aside the ADF was born and everything changed in the last decade of the 20th century, terrorism became global and the war in the Gulf saw the Australian SF (SASR and 2nd Commando) prioritised as combatants and not the RAR battalions, When Osama Bin Laden became a household name after September Eleven and our SFs were sent to Afghanistan.
I was knocked over when the ABC raised reports that the SASR and Commando had breached the Geneva Convention and incurred war crimes against Afghanistan citizens and will be investigated. I noted that the targets were all the pointy-end warriors and to my knowledge, not one officer was investigated.
I immediately remembered two events one whilst the ARA Cadre to the CMF at Bunbury in the early 1970s. There had been no ARA cadre there for nearly two years and I discovered fraud when evidence of qualifying for service and pay sheets had been falsified and I reported that to battalion headquarters. Three high-ranking (LtCol) officers investigated the fraud, there were three officers of the unit involved. During the investigation, I felt that there was a deliberate attempt to lay the blame on the NCO, including myself to protect the officers. The next was in Brisbane when an Ares soldier was killed in a 25-metre range when she shot herself with a 9 mm pistol. A major was to be the range conduct officer, but he ordered a sergeant to do the job. Only Infantry Warrant Officers and Commissioned Officers were qualified to conduct the shoot. The sergeant was charged, and he was judged by an Ex Major now a civil judge. I attended the court because the sergeant was an RAAOC clerk and I had been the RSM of 1 Training Group to which his unit was under command. He was found not guilty and I wrote to the then Chief of the Army explaining my despair that an NCO was a fall guy for an Officer and hoped that the sergeant’s career would not be jeopardised. The ADC to the C of A, an RMC cadet during my posting at the Duntroon as an Infantry Warrant Officer instructor wrote that there would be no action taken against the sergeant.
I relate these two real-life experiences to the Brereton Report where I understand no Officer was investigated, but who writes doctrine and policies for training for all corps and especially for SASR/Commando units, Officers and who sign off these instructions the Generals!
Surely for SF self-security and safety must be priority number one and when on ops in Afghanistan the security of small patrols must action to protect themselves. So where is my problem in this, Officers develop doctrine and policies that we all follow but when shit happens because of the training we undertake the officers are exempted from the investigation.
I have never heard of such injustices as served on 2 Sqn happening in the twenty years in the AMF. Warriors obey instructions and require initiative and common sense to survive in battle requires 95% training and 5% luck.
Good luck to you all, you have the training and there are many AMF warriors on your side.
Another two matters which clearly support the urgent need for the ADF to adopt a Code of Ethics. I recently wrote to the CA setting out a detailed justification for the introduction of a specific Code, in place of the present character guideline waffle (four case studies from personal experience were included). Examples of standards that might be included in such a Code are:
• I will never knowingly breach, nor condone the breach, of authorised regulations.
• If I learn of breaches of authorised regulations or unethical behaviour, I will report this to my chain of command without delay and without fear
or favour.
• If in command, I will pursue all reports of breaches of authorised regulations and unethical behaviour, until I am satisfied that the demands of
justice and ethics have been met.
• I will never place loyalty to my unit or to an individual, above the interests of the nation, the lives of my fellow service members, or the truth in
all matters.
Two matters which support the urgent need for the ADF to urgently adopt a Code of Ethics.
I recently wrote to the CA setting out a detailed justification for a specific code, rather than the generalised character waffle at present.
Examples that the code might embrace:
• I will never knowingly breach, nor condone the breach, of authorised regulations.
• If I learn of breaches of authorised regulations or unethical behaviour, I will report this to my chain of command without delay and without fear or favour.
• If in command, I will pursue all reports of breaches of authorised regulations, and unethical behaviour, until I am satisfied that the demands of justice and ethics have been met.
• I will never place loyalty to my unit or to an individual, above the interests of the nation, the lives of my fellow service members, or the truth in all matters.
Bob Buicks letter is in my opinion correct and succinct.
I am a National Serviceman who served in SVN from 66/67.
Officers never responsible for any stuff ups. Look at the Battle of Long Tan.
Dear Editor
Although far from perfect, it is somewhat gratifying to see the “system” has found the guts to strip some officers of their awards.
However, there is still a serious deficiency. The punishments metered out are for sins of omission. What is missing from all this is any mention of the most serious sin of COMMISSION that occurred during the war in Vietnam.
I refer to the decision by (then Brigadier) Stuart Graham to order the laying of a minefield from the town of Dat Do to the coast. This decision and the orders that were issued (shortly after his arrival in country), were totally contrary to our doctrine and our training. Even more damning, it was taken against all the advice of the officers and soldiers who had been in that theatre with that Task Force for the previous six months.
When it was pointed out that we did not have sufficient manpower to maintain surveillance over such a minefield (as required by our doctrine) we were told that task would be performed by the Vietnamese. At this the entire gathering of officers at that briefing burst into laughter – the proposition was that ludicrous. When we pointed out that the enemy would lift the mines and use them against us, we were informed that an anti-lift device would prevent that. When we demanded to be shown that device, we were told it was a secret. That anti lift devise included the use of the American hand grenade in use at the time. At that stage of our deployment to Vietnam, we had experienced a high rate of that grenade failing to detonate. We could have prevented that mistake.
As we all now know, our worst fears were realised. Several Engineer soldiers were killed laying that minefield and many of the casualties suffered by our forces from that time on, were caused by those mines, lifted by the enemy and used against us – exactly as we had predicted in our advice; ignored by Brigadier Graham.
In my humble opinion, Brigadier Graham should have been Court Martialled and drummed out of the Army in disgrace. Instead, he was promoted!