The Battle of Nui Le: Australia’s Final Stand in Vietnam
The Battle of Nui Le, fought on 21 September 1971, was the last major confrontation involving Australian and New Zealand forces in South Vietnam. As part of Operation Ivanhoe, Australian and New Zealand troops from the 4RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion engaged in intense combat with the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) 33rd Regiment in Phuoc Tuy Province. This battle marked a significant moment in Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War, which had spanned over nine years and was increasingly unpopular at home.
Background: Australia’s Withdrawal from Vietnam
By September 1971, Australia was preparing to withdraw its troops from Vietnam, following a decision made by the Australian government in late 1970. This gradual reduction of combat forces mirrored the strategy adopted by the United States, as both countries sought to extricate themselves from the protracted and unpopular conflict. Although the Australians had successfully pushed back the Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces during Operation Overlord in June, by September, these forces had returned to Phuoc Tuy Province. Intelligence suggested that the enemy was preparing to ambush the Australians, hoping to score a propaganda victory before their withdrawal was complete.
The PAVN 33rd Regiment posed the greatest threat to the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) as it sought to reassert control over the region. The well-trained and well-armed regiment had fought the Australians before, and their presence in the area indicated a looming confrontation. The 4RAR/NZ Battalion, including two Australian infantry companies (B and D Companies) and one New Zealand infantry company (V Company), was tasked with a reconnaissance-in-force operation to disrupt the enemy’s plans.
The Build-Up to the Battle
Operation Ivanhoe, launched in early September, was aimed at neutralizing the PAVN and VC forces in northern Phuoc Tuy Province. The Australians and New Zealanders were supported by elements of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, the 104th Field Battery, and American air assets. Intelligence had identified the presence of the 33rd Regiment’s headquarters and 3rd Battalion in the area, but unknown to the Australians, the 2nd Battalion had also moved into the region, increasing the enemy’s strength to approximately 1,100 soldiers.
On 19 September, PAVN forces launched a mortar and rocket attack on a South Vietnamese outpost at Cam My village. Australian armoured personnel carriers (M113s) were sent to investigate but were ambushed by a large PAVN force using rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and small arms fire. The next day, 11 Platoon of D Company made contact with a PAVN platoon, resulting in a brief skirmish that left four enemy soldiers dead. Signs indicated that a significant PAVN force had passed through the area.
The commander of the PAVN 33rd Regiment, Colonel Nguyen Van Thuong, believed the Australians were vulnerable due to their reduced artillery support. Based on reports from Viet Cong spies, he expected a battle between infantry forces alone and set ambushes accordingly. However, the Australians did not follow the expected route, avoiding the ambushes.
The Battle of Nui Le
On the morning of 21 September, patrols from 11 Platoon, D Company, discovered evidence of fortified enemy bunker positions near the Courtenay rubber plantation. B and D Companies advanced toward the positions near Nui Le, ready to engage. At midday, 12 Platoon made contact with a PAVN security element guarding the 33rd Regiment’s headquarters, suffering one dead and four wounded from RPG fire.
As the battle intensified, airstrikes were called in. United States Air Force F-4 Phantoms and A-37 Dragonfly aircraft bombed the enemy positions, while Australian artillery and helicopter gunships provided additional support. The PAVN forces appeared to retreat under the bombardment, but this was a ruse, and they remained in their bunkers, waiting for the Australians to advance.
At 2:00 PM, D Company was ordered to move forward and destroy the bunker system. Unknown to the Australians, the PAVN’s 2nd Battalion had not fled as expected. As 11 Platoon advanced 50 meters into the bunker complex, they were ambushed. Three soldiers were killed, and two were wounded. Despite the overwhelming firepower and close-quarter fighting, including hand-to-hand combat, the Australians managed to withdraw under heavy fire, but the bodies of their fallen comrades could not be recovered.
As night fell, the battle continued. The commander of 11 Platoon, Lieutenant Garry McKay, was hit by sniper fire. In the pitch-black conditions, Captain Greg Gilbert, the forward observer, directed artillery fire to within 25 meters of the Australian position, a dangerous manoeuvre that likely saved the company from being overrun. The PAVN commander, realizing that Australian artillery was still active, disengaged at 9:00 PM.
Aftermath and Legacy
The Battle of Nui Le concluded with five Australian soldiers dead and 24 wounded, making it one of the costliest engagements for Australia in the Vietnam War. The PAVN suffered unknown casualties, though 14 bodies were recovered on the battlefield. The following day, New Zealanders from V Company reinforced D Company and conducted a search of the area, finding the bodies of the fallen Australian soldiers.
For their actions during the battle, several soldiers were honoured. Second Lieutenant Garry McKay, who was severely wounded, was awarded the Military Cross, while Captain Gilbert received the Distinguished Service Medal in 2018.
The Battle of Nui Le marked the end of Australia’s combat role in Vietnam. It was a fierce and costly encounter that underscored the bravery and resilience of the Australian and New Zealand forces in the face of a formidable enemy. As the last major battle fought by ANZAC forces in Vietnam, it remains a significant chapter in the history of both nations’ involvement in the war.
For detail on the Battle of Núi Lê , see the two books: The 33rd Regiment – North Vietnamese Army: the Battles of Binh Ba and Nui Le by Chamberlain E.P. , 2014 and 2017 (179 pages including 21 appendices) that includes SIGINT material (with maps) and post-War discussions with 33rd Regiment veterans . Both books are free-to-read on-line on Scribd. Contrary to some accounts, the 33rd NVA Regiment did not move south into Phước Tuy in 1971 to give the soon-to-depart 1 ATF a “bloody nose”, but moved into Phước Tuy in September 1971 to avoid further engagements with the US 3rd Brigade in Long Khánh Province (see also the 4RAR/NZ (ANZAC) After Action Report for Operation Ivanhoe dated 4 November 1971). Also, despite some Australian post-War writings, neither the 33rd NVA Regiment commander – nor a battalion commander, were killed at the Battle of Núi Lê .
In 1971, the TF Comd argued that the op importance of tanks far outweighed any logistic advantage to be gained by withdrawing them early. He was overruled. My tank troop was withdrawn from operations at midnight on 31 August 1971. We were the last 1ATF was now an unbalanced force. The enemy took full advantage, just weeks later. Logistic convenience at the cost of soldiers’ lives. The briefest glance at a tactics pam reveals the role that armour should have in the withdrawal.