THE BATTLE OF SUOI BONG TRANG – 24 FEBRUARY 1966

ED: This is a view of Operation Rollingstone in 1966 by John Michael Black an American soldier.

The Battle of Suoi Bong Trang was a major action during the Vietnam War fought between the combined forces of the U.S. and Australia, against the Viet Cong and the NVA. The battle occurred in the vicinity of Tan Binh during Operation Rolling Stone, a major U.S. security operation to protect engineers building a road 19 miles northwest of Bien Hoa Airbase. During the battle, the 1st Brigade, U.S. 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR) fought off a night-time regiment-sized assault with massed firepower from artillery and tanks.

“Rolling Stone” had begun some two weeks earlier in response to VC harassment of U.S. engineers working on the road. Workmen had been subjected to daily sniping, mines and sabotage in an effort by local VC elements to stop the construction through an area they had long dominated. The road was planned to cut communist supply routes between War Zone C, the Mekong Delta, the Iron Triangle and War Zone D. The Australian unit (1 RAR) had been attached to the 173rd Airborne Brigade, but was temporarily reassigned to the 1st ID for the duration of Operation Rolling Stone.

Intelligence reports provided by the 337th Radio Research Company (ASA), the Direct Support Unit of the 1st ID, and other sources had alerted allied commanders to a large VC and NVA force moving into the area. Three battalions of the VC 9th Division were massing to the west. Units identified included J10 Battalion of the 761st Regiment NVA, 707 Battalion of the 763rd Regiment NVA, and D800 Independent Battalion; in total some 2,000 men. The Aussies had also noted that in contacts with enemy troops, they were now encountering “main-force” elements, well supplied and armed with new AK-47 assault rifles. A major communist attack was expected and considered imminent.

By late afternoon on 23 February, 1 RAR had adopted a defensive position near Suoi Bong Trang (creek), and the U.S. engineers had moved into defensive positions within their perimeter. Alerted by the Aussies, a platoon of M48 Patton tanks from Troop B, 1st Squadron, U.S. 4th Cav and a second 105mm howitzer field battery from 1st Bn, U.S. 5th Artillery Regiment had moved in to defend the Brigade HQ. The 1st Bn, U.S. 26th IR, under command of Lt. Col. Y.Y. Phillips, had also been deployed to the area by last light, augmenting Co. B, 1st Bn, U.S. 28th IR. Additional ammunition had been brought forward, in anticipation of the expected enemy attack, and as night fell, all preparations were complete. The Allied forces settled in to watch and wait.

At 2200 hours, soldiers from B Co., 1 RAR, occupying the western sector of the Australian perimeter noticed moving lights 270 yds. to their front. Maj. Ian McFarlane, B Co. commander, requested artillery and mortar fire to target the location, but the request was declined by Lt. Col. Alex Preece, 1 RAR commander. Meanwhile a small Aussie patrol, deployed forward of the company’s main defensive position, and under the command of Pvt. Walter Brunalli, had observed the lights moving closer, east of Brigade HQ. Two U.S. tanks had been positioned forward of the American perimeter, with a squad of infantry posted out on the eastern approaches, and by midnight they had also reported sounds of movement and intermittent flashes of light through the stands of rubber trees surrounding the camp.

In the early morning of 24 February, just after midnight, sporadic firing was heard throughout the area. The forward U.S. listening posts had detected small groups of VC moving outside the perimeter and sentries had opened fire, killing two and forcing the remainder to withdraw into the darkness. Col. Edgar N. Glotzbach, commander of the U.S. 1st Brigade, awaiting the attack by the main force, withheld the bulk of the firepower at his disposal.

Pfc. Ron Heurlin was a member of Co. B, 28th Regiment, 1st ID; called the “Black Lions.” Heurlin had been selected for the squad to go out in front of his company and act as a listening post. “We ended up in the bushes about 15 feet off this little dirt road,” Heurlin says. “We had no machine-guns, but we had Claymore mines. About 11:30 p.m. while I was leaning against a tree, I heard one word in Vietnamese spoken very fast. Five or six seconds later I could see these heads coming down the road. They got up beside us and we cut into them. They scattered in three different directions. We got permission to move our location because it had been compromised. We moved back toward our main unit and set up along the edge of the dirt road again,” Heurlin said.

With their defences alerted, the Allied forces waited in silence for the next 45 minutes. The battle began at 0145 with a heavy barrage of enemy mortar and small arms fire. The Americans responded with small arms, machine-guns, tank fire, mortars and artillery. Over the next hour the firing grew in intensity until, at 0300, the VC and NVA switched their attack to the northwest side of the American perimeter, augmenting their fire with recoilless rifles.

Glotzbach expected a full-scale ground assault, but the large force was held back by the sheer weight of U.S. firepower, with heavy artillery including 8-inch and 175mm howitzers firing in support from Phuoc Vinh, in addition to the defender’s own artillery which was now firing over open sights directly into the enemy positions. In total, eight field batteries were available. The Aussie patrol had remained in position despite the proximity of the VC, and with the Americans pouring massive fire into the area, was soon caught in the crossfire. The chaos and noise was overwhelming, and Pvt. Brunalli was wounded in the arm.

“About 3 a.m. we started hearing enemy mortars coming our way,” Ron Heurlin says. “They had our location pegged and the mortars were raining down right on top of us. Right after that we heard bugles blowing. The NVA came after us on three sides and there were only seven of us in the listening post. Within a few minutes five out of the seven of us were killed. The guy in front of me was hit in the face with something and I was hit three times by enemy fire: once in the neck, my left shoulder and they put one right through my chest,” he said. “I ended up on my back on the ground. Then the NVA shifted their fire to our main base which was maybe 100 meters beyond us. We were caught in a firefight between our base and the NVA.”

Although the Australian position was not the focus of the attack, it too came under attack from 60-mm mortars, killing an American engineer. There was confusion over the source of the rounds, and both Gloztbach and Preece accused the other of firing on their positions in the darkness. U.S. tactical aircraft soon arrived overhead to illuminate the battlefield, and the Australians were able to join the fight, firing into masses of VC and NVA troops seen milling around in confusion.

Earlier in the day, Aussie patrols had ambushed and killed several VC scout teams, preventing them from conducting a final reconnaissance of the area. Unaware of the newly strengthened Allied defences, the VC and NVA battalions had assaulted straight into the teeth of two U.S. field artillery batteries firing over open sights, as well as tanks supported by infantry. Using anti-personnel canister, flechette and splintex rounds, as well as prepositioned banks of Claymore mines, the Americans broke up several assaults with heavy casualties, while the Australians poured small arms fire into the flank of what had turned into a costly and futile attack.

Near 0300, three VC moved to within 25 yds. Of Brunalli’s patrol, taking up firing positions. The Australians killed one and wounded another who was dragged away by the third. The Aussies then withdrew to another location, crouching low under brush and trees. The night was pitch-black; the noise was horrendous; the air filled with smoke, the smell of cordite and death. The two U.S. tanks forward of Brigade HQ were overrun by NVA troops and their crews were killed.

By 0400, having suffered heavy losses, the VC and NVA began to retreat from the battlefield. As large groups of enemy troops moved past their position in the darkness, the Aussie patrol was in an untenable position. They clashed briefly with one group of 15 VC, and Maj. McFarlane ordered the patrol to withdraw, so he could call in artillery and mortars. Moving to achieve a clean break, the patrol engaged another group of 10 VC with a volley of small arms fire before successfully completing the move back to their own lines.

With the enemy withdrawal carrying them past the Australian position, constant fire was maintained on them as they made a partial retreat. But as daybreak neared, the enemy leadership seemed unable to commit to a complete withdrawal or an all-out attack. Finally, a counter-attack was attempted at 0530, but earlier losses had been so heavy that they were unable to mount a massed assault. Only a few disjointed attacks followed, with none more than 40-men strong. By 0645 all attacks ceased and the enemy completely withdrew before dawn, avoiding the arrival of additional U.S. air support.

Pfc. Heurlin’s company had sent a tank to attempt the rescue his squad during the height of the battle, but enemy fire was so intense, the tank had to retreat. “…It had to back off and leave us there,” Heurlin recalled. “I laid out there on the ground so close to enemy machine-gunners I could hear them talking, I laid there from 3 a.m., when I was wounded, until 7 a.m., when I was rescued. I took my M-16 rifle and put it on full automatic and laid it beside me. That’s all I could do. If they had known we were there they could have walked over and finished us off,” he explained.

At first light, Australian patrols located 89 dead and 11 wounded VC in front of their positions. Countless others had simply been disintegrated by artillery and tank fire; the battlefield was littered with shattered human remains tangled among the splintered trees. Later, 154 bodies were bulldozed into a bomb crater. It was estimated another 200 casualties had been removed from the battlefield by the enemy as they retreated.

Residents of Ap Bo village, had been conscripted by the VC to carry away many of their dead and wounded with ox carts, and the villagers had suffered casualties from artillery and mortar fire as a result. A number of the enemy had also been captured during the battle, as had large quantities of equipment, small arms, ammunition, crew-served weapons, and grenades.

American casualties were 11 killed and 72 wounded, and 1 RAR had two men wounded. One U.S. tank had been destroyed, while two tanks and four armoured personnel carriers were damaged. The combined U.S.-Australian force had won an impressive victory, but with the defenders exhausted and ammunition running low, Col. Glotzbach chose not to pursue the retreating force. Instead, the Americans and Australians focused on securing the battlefield and evacuating their own casualties.

For the next two days, 1 RAR continued to provide protection to the U.S. engineers before being replaced by a U.S. infantry battalion. The Aussies flew out on 26 February to rejoin the 173rd AB. Following their defeat at the Suoi Bong Trang, the Viet Cong attempted to avoid further contact, choosing instead to harass the American work crews from a distance with occasional mortar and sniper fire. Those tactics proved ineffective however, and the road was completed by 2 March.

What this report does not say, and no other official mention of this fight mentions, is that in the early morning of February 26th, just at dawn, our own artillery started dropping 175 rounds on us. They landed in the mess area and killed at least 5 more troops before the Brigade Commander got them to stop. A Red Haze flight picked up our bonfire and, not knowing that we were there, started dropping rounds at dawn.