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This is the INTSUM compiled after the Battle of Nui Le on November 4 1971.

Dave Morris.

CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN ARMY

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ANNEX B TO 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Bn

AFTERACTION REPORT OPERATION IVANHOE

DATED 4 NOV 71

INTELLIGENCE SUMMMARY

References: A. 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn Weekly Intelligence Review 718/41 dated 22 Sep 71

1. 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn Weekly Intelligence Review 718/42 dated 29 Sep 71
2. 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn Weekly Intelligence Review 718/43 dated 6 Oct 71

General Background

1. Early in Sep a number of consistent sniffer readings to the East of the NUI LE and in the vicinity of the NUI SAO feature, indicated the possible presence of an unidentified enemy group – thought to be elements from 33 NVA Regt.
2. As a result, D Coy 4 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Bn was redeployed from the area of old FSB ASH (YS 3682) to the East of Courtenay Plantation into old FSB TRISH (YS 5288); and commenced a search of the country to the North and East, later progressing to the West and South covering the NUI LE area.
3. On 10 Sep VR aircraft reported a number of tracks leading into the Province from the North.
4. On the 14 Sep at YS 512871 D Coy contacted 2 enemy carrying packs who withdrew South/West along a track. The next day they contacted 2 enemy scouts, killing one at YS515867. The enemy was moving East – West using a compass, and a track for a squad sized group was located running North – South in the area. The enemy KIA carried no identification.
5. American forces had experienced numerous contacts in the vicinity of NUI HOT with elet:1emts of Regt HQ until 16 Sep. However, from then on there had been a lack of contact in the area.
6. VR.ac also revealed a number of tracks in the SUOI RAN, SUOI LE area at this time. It is likely that 3 Bn had moved from its base area East of BAO BINH down by the SUOI NHAC into the Province.
7. During the early hours 19 Sep 626 RF Coy outpost (YS 461834) received an ABF of 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, and 82mm mortars. 3 RF were WIA when several RR rounds impacted inside the post. The use of that calibre RR indicated the presence of C17 Recoilless Rifle Coy (max str 20). 82mm Mortars are held by both C16 1-lortar Coy (max str 25) and C12 Heavy Weapons Coy – 3 Bn, (max str 30). VR as reported tracks to and from the firing point/base plate to the East.
8. Shortly after a light sapper attack was launched against the village of NGAI GIAO (YS 463794) by approx. 10-12 enemy, who threw 3 satchel charges at outlying buildings.

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9. However, the group most likely responsible for the sapper attack is thought to have been C3 Coy 1 Bn 274 VC Regt – who had been allocated the task of “occupyingNGAI GIA0 according to documents CIA by 1 ATF ptl on 18 Aug 71.
10. Subsequent attacks on the village on 28 Sep and 10 Oct (after elements from 33 NVA Regt arc assessed to have departed from the area) would seem to back such reasoning. However, the capability of the VC during the attacks did not appear to be high, so it is more likely that local NGAI GIAO) ordistrict (CHAU DUC) forces were involved (Interrogation of PW’s 1rom these two forces, CL on 20 Oct, tends to support that the attack. were undertaken by them: not elements from either Regt).
11. On the morning 20 Sep, 4 AFCs from 1 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt returning North along Route 2 were ambushed at YS 461821 by approx. 20 enemy, who were dug in, fired RPG 2s and 7s at the vehicles. One enemy was KIA. He was carrying a greater than normal amount of ammo (174rds 7.62mm short) but no identification marks/ documents. Again, characteristic of 33 NVA unit.12.
12. The amount, and types of ammo employed by the enemy during the attacks on 19/20 Sep (75mm RR, 82mm Mor, RPG 2 and 7) indicated the presence of a regular unit, operating East of Route 2
13. Agent reports substantiated the existence of such a group.

Base Areas

14. It was apparent that Regt HQ 33 NVA Regt, anxious to evade from 3 Bde (US) operations, had moved South from the NUI HOT area into PHOUC TUY Province.
15. Bn was also moved from its base area East of BAI BINH, into the province.
16. Both groups may have thought that the Australian Forces no longer operate1 in the area. From Jun-Aug 71 there v:as no sizeable ground coverage East or South of Courtenay Plantation – all Coy sized operations conducted since Aug had managed to keep resupply to a minimum, thus not advertising their tasks unduly.

17• Combined with the announcement of the impending withdrawal of Australian Forces (which it is assessed, 33 Rgt. HQ would have known of by early Sep) and pressure from 3 Bde: a new area. was reconnoitered.

18. An area was located near the NUI LE – SAO features. It was located near known RSG re-supply routes, had good canopy for protection against aerial observation – which had previously contributed to the Regt1s considerable casualties. There were high features to assist with communications and observation. The SUOI YOUERT, and SUOI TAM BO offered good water supply and combined with the surrounding terrain to restrict the employment of allied amour in the area.

The Threat

19.The establishing of an operating base in this area would provide relatively easy access to the villages and outposts of DUC THANH District.

20.There was also the agent report that elements of 33 Regt would support operations of 274 Regt along Route 2, though this seemed doubtful.

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21 The strength of 33 NVA Regt HQ and all Sp Coys was assessed to be 378 and 3 Bn was held at 300 strong. 1 Bn (str 300) was not thought to be in the area, having been released from its task of providing security for Regt HQ. It was identified in central LONG KNANH Province from documents CIA by 984 RF Coy on 15/16 Sep.

22. Regt HQ 274 VC Regt was, at the time, 300 strong; and 1 Bn totalled 235 persons.

Enemy Losses

23.A list of enemy casualties and captured weapons is attached as Appendix 1.

Installations and caches

23.Installations and caches located by the unit are summerised as Annex E.

Captured Equipment

25. A summary of equipment, including munitions captured, is attached as Appendix 2.

Energy Activities/Tactics

26. On 20 Sep D Coy killed 1NVA Ln a contact at YS 51185 although no identification was apparent.

27• Elements of D Coy were engaged by RPG and SA fire on the morning of 21 Sep in the vie YS 513857. Throughout the 21 Sep repeated air and artillery strikes were employed in support of D Coy as a series of assaults were launched upon (what was later found to be) the Western most bunker system of a 4-system complex, large enough (24 completed bunkers with 15 prepared bunker sites) to accommodate the

bulk of 3 Bn 33 NVA Regt.

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28 · The NVA defenders employed good fire control – seeking out D Coy1s machine guns, and areas from which commands were being shouted. Most bunkers had fire lanes cut (up to 5ft in width) to cover the most likely approaches and were sited to be mutually supporting. The majority of CHICOM grenades thrown at D Coy fortunately did not detonate.

29 Advantage was taken of the good canopy cover and high ground to the NVJ, North and NE of the complex to employ intensive ground fire against supporting helicopter fire teams and Jade ac throughout the day.

30 As D Coy extracted its casualties and moved out of the bunker systems to allow for further sp fire, it received SA fire on its flanks from mobile groups of NVA who had come from other systems within the complex. This follow up of D Coy continued to the perimeter of its NDP, which was also under fire, from a separate 14 bunker complex 400 meters SW from the contact area.

31 Fire from this system was mainly directed from an OP (later a 30ft ladder against a suitable tree was found during the search of the system). Harassing fire continued into the NDP until well after darkness.

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32 The reason for the close follow up of D Coy appears to have been an attempt to prevent the employment of close aerial and artillery support. Employing an NVA tactic of withdrawing in the direction from which they are under attack, incorporating flanking movement/harassment. Thirdly, the NVA were concerned that

D Coy was moving (to its NDP) close to the 14-bunker system, and went to assist its inhabitants evacuate the system, by harassing D Coy .

33 A total of 9 NVA were confirmed as being accounted for by D Coy during the day of 21 Sep.

34 A heavily used track subsequently located by D Coy 3 RAR revealed that the NVA had departed the complex to the North (probably the HQ group), whilst a heavier track to the Northeast but South (in YS 5284) of the complex, was the probable route of the follow up/withdrawal force.

35  B Coy followed up an insulated communication/navigation wire contacted and killed a member identified as being from C9 Coy 3 Bn at YS 487833 during the morning of 21 Sep.

36 Subsequent follow up/search located many freshly cut – recently well used tracks in the area – and during the afternoon a further contact developed, with elements of the Coy receiving 60mm mortar fire, and a further NVA soldier was confirmed as killed, as a B Coy subunit (4 Pl) moved to assist members of the coy wounded during the shelling.

37 Supporting aircraft again reported ground fire from this area. From what appears to have been a suspected NVA mortar base plate position that was engaged.by artillery, a secondary explosion was reported in YS 5083. (Each Coy of C10, C11 have at least one 60mr.1 mortar within its organization). found during the search of the system).

38 The insulated wire located by B Coy in the vicinity of the ABFs, and ambushing position on Route 2, and through the subsequent contact areas (YS 4682, YS 4683, 4883, 4983) was probably used as a night navigation aid and communications.

link between attacking/observing elements and HQ 33 NVA Regt used similar insulated wire linking such positions to the South of LONG BINH for their attacks during TET 1969.

39 Direction of the withdrawal of the NVA (assessed to be composed of elements from the Regt Sp Coys C16 mor, C17 and some C20 Si6s and elements from 3 Bn probably for protection) from the B Coy area was East to the SUOI YOUZRT then NE, and ESE. Tracks were later located in the area by C Coy searching further to the East.

40. A NVA soldier carrying documents mentioning C17 RR, C19 Engr and C20 Sigs Coys of 33 NVA Regtwas KIA by Sp Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt of 21 Sep well to the NE at YS 637873 during an abortive ambush on Route 2 against 1 Tp A Sqn.
41. Other incidents during the operation included the detonating of two AT mines (consisting of approx. 60lbs CHICOM explosive) by two APCs of 1 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regtin the Courtenay Rubber on 25 Sep 71. It is likely that the mines were placed in position by elements from C2 (ex A2) Engr Coy BA I.DNG and CHAU DUC Engr Cell who were based just to the South of the Plantation near XA BANG in AUG 71.

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42 C Coy located a cache on a platform in water-logged country at YS 473869. There were 25 x 15 litre bags of rice – which appeared to have been in place about one month – probably stores belonging 814 RSG or C5 Coy of J85 Tpt Bn who have operated in the area recently. An old German rifle was also located in the vicinity by C Coy, likely to have been guerilla equipment.

Assessment

43 The building of good bunker systems, and the cutting of tracks to facilitate rapid redeployment of subunits in the vicinity of HUI SAO/Route 2, indicated that Regt HQ and 3 Bn had intended to establish a semi-permanent base for future operations in that area of PHOUC TUY Province. Indications are that the NVA group intend to remain in the area, had it not been for the reaction of 1 ATF and sub­sequent losses sustained by the NVA in action.

44. There is no doubt that the quick retaliatory reaction by AFCs from 1Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt when ambushed on 20 Sep; and aggressive action by D Coy and B Coy with plentiful close air and artillery support of 21 Sep 71; were responsible in forcing the NVA to abandon their efforts (which had been considerable) to harass the district and return to more secure surroundings North of the Province boundary.

Today I have a movie for you it run for 1hr 40 mins … if you had an m16 fail to fire you will understand why by watching this movie.

If you were to survey many Australians, they would likely agree that the primary duty of the Australian government is to safeguard the nation’s defence. However, the concept of “Defence of Australia” is more complex than it initially seems.

While most Australians unquestionably support defending the mainland and safeguarding economic interests both in the Indo-Pacific region and globally, there’s a challenge in determining where the interests of defending Australia’s mainland intersect with its economic and strategic interests on a regional and global scale. This challenge is exacerbated by the current global landscape, which is marked by increased multipolarity and competition among major and emerging powers.

Former Prime Minister Paul Keating and strategic policy experts like Hugh White argue that Australia’s defence strategy predominantly revolves around its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). They suggest that beyond this zone, Australia relies heavily on the protection of “great and powerful friends” for its security.

The 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) proposed a shift in defence posture, emphasizing a strategy of denial rather than direct defence against invasion. This entails leveraging long-range capabilities and future nuclear-powered submarines to control and deter hostilities in critical maritime corridors, notably the Straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda.

However, critics like historian Alex McDermott and former foreign minister Alexander Downer argue that Australia’s defence strategy mirrors the isolationist tendencies of the 1930s. They highlight a historical reluctance to engage actively in global conflicts and a heavy reliance on alliances, particularly with the United States.

While there’s acknowledgment of the need to update defence capabilities, there’s also criticism that current strategies fail to address the evolving geopolitical landscape adequately. The focus remains on dominating the sea-air gap, reminiscent of strategies outlined in the 1987 Defence white paper.

To address these shortcomings, there’s a call for a more balanced approach to defence, moving away from a sole reliance on “great and powerful friends” towards developing serious and lethal defence capabilities. This shift requires a broader understanding of Australia’s role in the region and a commitment to investing in capabilities that can operate effectively both domestically and throughout the Indo-Pacific.

Moreover, there’s a recognition that economic resilience is vital for national security. Strengthening economic resilience is seen as a crucial aspect of deterrence against economic coercion from adversaries. This necessitates a long-term perspective and a willingness to invest in economic diversification and innovation.

Ultimately, Australia must engage in a transparent dialogue with its citizens about its defence strategy and broader geopolitical ambitions. This includes considering Australia’s role as a regional or even global power and the implications of such a positioning for current and future generations. Breaking away from short-term thinking and embracing a more long-term perspective is essential for Australia to navigate the challenges of the new era of great power competition successfully.

ED: Some advice: Before making a claim ensure that you speak with a qualified advocate at the RSL or veteran’s organisation.

Modernising DVA’s ICT is one of our top priorities and a focus of the Royal Commission’s Interim Report.

Recent enhancements to MyService are making it easier for veterans and families to lodge claims and access support and services.

When claiming Initial Liability, Disability Compensation Payment, Application for Increase to Disability Compensation Payments and (from 26 February 2024) Permanent Impairment claims (DRCA/MRCA), you are now:

• prompted to provide the information needed to support the claim at the time you submit it
• notified through your myGov inbox if we need further information about your claim, along with a Task to complete that helps you to provide the additional information required
• given enhanced options to upload documents to your claims, including any ‘Other’ documents you might like to add up until determination, and view details of your documents and claims.

This means you can now view up-to-date information and provide all documents via MyService for all claims, whether submitted through MyService or other channels, reducing the need to send that information by email or post.

For more information, please see the MyService Enhancements Factsheet. For any further assistance, please call us on 1800 VETERAN (1800 838 372).

ED: This was in my inbox and poses a question … Thanks Geoff.

Set aside politics for just a second. My question is … If these people worked for you or your company and they could not answer a simple question like they are asked, would you fire them for not knowing facts highly relevant their job, a fact that are actually the fabric of their employment?

I would, but then again in this current world facts are not important it’s the objective.

The question is… What percentage of CO2 is in the atmosphere?

ED: My view: If it’s a fundamental aspect of their work, especially if they are in a field related to environmental science, climate change, or policymaking, then yes, it would be reasonable to expect them to know such basic information.

As for the percentage of CO2 in the atmosphere, as of 2022, it was approximately around 0.04%. It’s crucial for informed decision-making, especially in sectors where environmental impact is a concern.

If CO2 levels were to drop too low, it could potentially hinder the ability of plants to perform photosynthesis effectively, leading to reduced plant growth and productivity. This, in turn, could impact ecosystems, agriculture, and the availability of food resources.

Furthermore, CO2 plays a role in regulating Earth’s temperature through the greenhouse effect. While excessive levels of CO2 can contribute to global warming and climate change, too little CO2 could potentially lead to cooling of the planet, altering climate patterns in unpredictable ways.

While carbon dioxide concentrations dropping below 0.02% might not pose an immediate danger, it would have significant long-term consequences for Earth’s biosphere and climate if sustained over extended periods.

The Urgent Need for Recognition and Support for Australia’s Veterans and Families.

By Luke Gosling OAM MP

For many Afghanistan veterans and their families, the withdrawal from Kabul in 2021 and the imagery of the triumphant Taliban screamed failure.

Not since the fall of Saigon in 1975 had Australians been confronted with shocking images of our failed involvement in a foreign war.

Aware of our Vietnam Veterans’ experience, our Afghan veterans wonder how they will be remembered.

Afghanistan represents Australia’s longest military engagement.

Of the tens of thousands of service personnel deployed there, 41 were killed – their families left irreversibly damaged. Another 300 soldiers were seriously injured. Countless others deal with physical, psychological, and moral injury.

It is important to remember that Australia committed its defence personnel and civilians to the war to fulfil our U.S. alliance obligations after 9/11 and to deny terrorist organisations the use of Afghanistan as a training ground for renewed attacks around the world.

Our loss in this war, the perception of collective punishment for alleged war crimes, the sensationalism of sections of our media, and our failure to hold people accountable for poor decisions during the war, and in its aftermath, have had a significant impact on that war’s veterans.

It’s why I fought for the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide, as well as for 3,000 Afghanistan veterans to retain their Meritorious Unit Citation.

Photo: Luke Gosling OAM MP – taken in Kandahar 2003 providing security during the election process for the Loya Jirga Constitutional Convention

I am a veteran, and although I did not serve with the Australian Defence Force in Afghanistan, my experience with the country began 20 years ago when I worked to secure an Afghan-led democratic election process in southern Afghanistan.

I experienced some of the beauty and terror of that place and the pride of the people, as well as the complexity of the human landscape and the difficulty of the operating environment.

It had to be experienced to be believed.

I do understand why many of our veterans question how they could be judged harshly for their service – like Vietnam veterans before them – and why no one seems to be advocating for them.

In the face of consistent negative media coverage, I will continue to argue that the many should not be punished for the sins of the few.

Veterans of Afghanistan wonder whether our nation will forget their service or whether we will remember them and recognise that this was a real war, a hard-fought war, and that a cruel and insidious regime was held at bay for over twenty years.

The work of our veterans allowed for the building of local infrastructure, the education of women and girls, and the expansion of democracy.

Their leadership demonstrated to Afghanistan’s proud people that those who rule them should do so with dignity and respect.

Veterans of Afghanistan wonder whether our nation will forget their service or whether we will remember them and recognise their service.

There is much more we can do today to better support our Afghanistan veterans and families, beginning by commemorating their service with a welcome home, perhaps around the time of the AWM redevelopment opening, and acknowledging our failings and learning how we can do better.

We owe it to the veterans and their families to address this issue formally, to provide them a voice, and to listen.

But let us not confuse this proposed review with the important work of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide that will report this year, nor with the work of the Special Investigator.

The review I am recommending should be a detailed research project, with stringent ethical oversight and broad terms of reference, that recommends positive actions to address the human impact on returned Australian soldiers and families of two decades of war in Afghanistan and the Middle East more broadly.

But aren’t there reviews galore already? What will another one add?

It’s true that the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, which in 1999 found that the children of Vietnam veterans were three times more likely to die from suicide than their peers, has also pioneered extensive research into veteran suicide among the Afghanistan and Iraq veteran cohorts.

Ample health-related reviews have also been commissioned by the departments of veterans’ affairs and defence, but none of them could seriously delve into the crucial question of the health impact of how our civilian and military leaders, senior public servants, and media all handled our longest war.

Such a project, led by veteran academics – neither commissioned nor directed by government – would make veterans and their families feel valued, would reinforce the importance of the purpose that is derived from military service, and give policymakers crucial insights to enhance the lives of those that serve, and will serve, our great nation.

It would also help Australia live up to our promise within the Veterans’ Covenant: ‘For what they have done, this we will do.’

Australian gunners showcased their expertise and resilience in the recent US Army’s Best by Test artillery competition held in Hawaii. Hailing from the 4th Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery, a team of 31 personnel competed vigorously against international counterparts during the nine-day event on Oahu.

In a fierce display of military prowess, physical endurance, and technical artillery proficiency, the Australian Army gunners faced off against members of the US 2nd Division and 25th Infantry Division. Among the accolades earned, the 109 Battery clinched the title of Best Fire Support Team, with Captain Pat Glasby receiving individual recognition as the Best Forward Observer.

Captain Taras Jakubovsky recounted the team’s journey through challenging terrains characterized by steep hills and dense jungle, compounded by relentless rainfall. Despite the adverse conditions, the team persisted, averaging a mere four hours of sleep per night and covering extensive distances with heavy packs daily. Captain Jakubovsky emphasized the camaraderie and mutual support among team members, acknowledging the collective effort required to overcome physical and mental hurdles.

Reflecting on the experience, Captain Jakubovsky expressed pride in the team’s performance, viewing it as a validation of their training and a testament to their preparedness. He underscored the significance of collaboration with US allies, highlighting the opportunity to align methodologies and strengthen strategic partnerships.

Lance Bombardier Thomas Mundy echoed Captain Jakubovsky’s sentiments, emphasizing the rigorous nature of the competition and the team’s resilience in adverse conditions. He emphasized the value of integrating with American counterparts, noting the exchange of operational techniques and the enhancement of efficiency.

In conclusion, Mundy emphasized the honour of representing Australia on the global stage, emphasizing the importance of collaborative efforts and maintaining a positive reputation among international allies.

In February, the 1st Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment immersed themselves in an intensive week of jungle warfare training, conducted amidst the dense foliage of Tully, Queensland. Beginning with foundational jungle skills, the training swiftly escalated to encompass live-fire jungle shakeouts at the platoon level, and further advanced to hone individual and section-level proficiencies.

Reflecting on the comprehensive training, Lance Corporal Jamal Basaid of Bravo Company emphasized the multifaceted nature of the curriculum, which delved into the intricacies of tactics, techniques, and procedures essential for survival in the jungle environment. “There’s a wealth of knowledge to absorb when it comes to thriving in the jungle,” remarked Lance Corporal Basaid, encapsulating the breadth of skills imparted during the rigorous sessions.

Major Tom Folley underscored the unforgiving nature of jungle operations, drawing parallels to historical campaigns like Kokoda and the Vietnam War, which epitomized the relentless challenges posed by such environments. “The jungle presents a unique set of obstacles, where vegetation, terrain, and weather exert profound influence,” Major Folley elucidated. “Operating in such conditions demands heightened resourcefulness, adaptability, and resilience from our soldiers.”

Elaborating on the specialized tactics necessitated by jungle warfare, Major Folley emphasized the primacy of fundamental soldiering skills in navigation. “Jungle navigation relies heavily on traditional methods; the dense canopy obstructs GPS signals, emphasizing the reliance on maps, compass bearings, and pacing,” he elucidated. Furthermore, he emphasized the imperative for soldiers to wield their weapons effectively amidst the dense foliage, adapting their tactics to suit the environment.

Echoing Major Folley’s sentiments, Lance Corporal Basaid stressed the importance of morale amidst the challenges of jungle living. “Maintaining high morale is pivotal, fostered through camaraderie, humour, and mutual understanding,” he emphasized. However, he also emphasized the necessity of focus and commitment when duty calls, highlighting the soldier’s inherent ability to switch gears when faced with operational demands.

In essence, the jungle warfare training encapsulated not only the acquisition of vital skills but also fostered a profound understanding of the unique demands and challenges posed by jungle environments, ensuring that soldiers are prepared to confront and overcome adversity in the most austere conditions.